Bridging The Gap: Some Thoughts About
Interstitial Lawmaking And The Federal
Securities Laws by Johnson, Kevin R.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 3 Article 4
Summer 6-1-1991
Bridging The Gap: Some Thoughts About
Interstitial Lawmaking And The Federal Securities
Laws
Kevin R. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin R. Johnson, Bridging The Gap: Some Thoughts About Interstitial Lawmaking And The Federal
Securities Laws, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 879 (1991), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol48/iss3/4
ARTICLES
BRIDGING THE GAP: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT
INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING AND THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
KEvmn R. JoHNsoN*
True wisdom ... is not certain of anything in this world of
contradictions .... I
INTRODUCTION
Few would think that the esoteric field of federal securities regulation
would raise some of the most fundamental questions of constitutional and
jurisprudential theory. Last Term, however, the United States Supreme
Court decided two federal securities law cases, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson2 and Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc.,' that raised precisely those types of questions.
Students of jurisprudence grapple with the question of defining the
constraints, if any, on judges "making" law. Although not a politically
palatable understanding of the judicial role, 4 mainstream legal thought
generally accepts that, at least to some degree, judges legitimately, and
indeed have the responsibility to, engage in lawmaking.5 The search for
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1980, University
of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1983, Harvard University. Special thanks are owed to Chris
Cameron, who read and offered helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and
Lynne K. Zellhart, University of California, Davis, Class of 1993, whose invaluable research
assistance and comments made this Article possible.
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT 81 (T. Nelson & Son ed. 1907).
2. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
3. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Boston Globe, July 1, 1991, at 3, col. 5 (reporting statement of rumored
Supreme Court nominee, Emilio Garza, that it is Justice's "responsibility to ... apply the
law. We're not elected to be legislators."); Wash. Post, July 26, 1987, at AS, col. 1 (reporting
statement of Court nominee Robert Bork that activist judiciary "engages in judicial legislation,
and that seems to me inconsistent with the democratic form of government ... ").
5. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 457 (1990) (recognizing that
"[jiudges make rather than find law, and they use as inputs both the rules laid down by
legislatures and previous courts ... and their own ethical and policy prefrences"); G.
CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92 (1982) (stating "[t]hat [judges make
law] is by now an accepted fact. . .") (footnote omitted); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
4 (1980) (positing that, "[o]f course courts make law all the time"). See generally B. CARDozo,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS 113-41 (1921) (discussing "judge as a legislator"); L.
JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERIcAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS (1969) (same).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:879
principles restricting judicial discretion in making law has given rise to an
abundance of theories and volumes of writings.
Jurisprudential quandaries of this variety at first glance might not seem
relevant to the federal system in the United States. In the unique form of
government established by the Constitution, the fundamental institutional
bedrock is the separation of powers. 6 The distribution of power in the
federal system is simple in theory. Congress, elected by the voting public
and thus politically accountable, passes the laws; the executive branch
enforces the laws; the judiciary ensures that its coordinate branches faithfully
comply with the laws passed by Congress as well as the Constitution.7 In
this constitutional system of checks and balances, it might appear that there
is little, if any, room for federal judges to make law.
Adding a further layer of complexity, the Constitution creates a unique
distribution of lawmaking power between the federal and state governments.
Certain substantive areas are of such national concern-conducting foreign
relations and regulating interstate commerce are two examples-that the
Constitution provides the federal government with exclusive authority over
those matters.8 However, federal power is restricted and the national gov-
ernment is limited from treading unduly on state prerogative.9 The states
thus are the primary lawmaking authorities in the United States. 0 These
are baseline principles of "Our Federalism.""
6. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-1 to 5-24, at 18-400
(2d ed. 1988).
_.1 7. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); see also THE
/FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (stating that "[tihe accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary irl the same hands, whether of one, a few
or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny"); C. Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted
to the Federal Convention, in III THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 108
(M. Farrand ed. 1937) ("In a government, where the liberties of the people are to be preserved,
and the laws well administered, the executive, legislative and judicial, should ever be separate
and distinct, and consist of parts, mutually forming a check upon each other").
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(foreign relations power).
9. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (stating that "[tihe powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite").
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people"); Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (stating that "[tihe
great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of
property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is
found in the statutes and decisions of the state"). The spirit of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), overruled Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), which prohibited federal regulation of certain types of state and local employees
because such employment involved matters "essential to [the] separate and independent
existence" of the states, represents a perhaps extreme view of federalist theory. See Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for the Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 10-22 (1988).
11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING
One type of federal law raises concern about judges making law as well
as separation of powers and federalism questions.' 2 In 1938, Justice Brandeis
wrote in the venerable case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that "[e]xcept
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. There is no federal
general common law."' 3 The Erie doctrine, as elaborated upon in subsequent
cases and commentary, often is ballyhooed as representing the essence of
American federalism.'
4
On the same day that Erie was decided, however, Justice Brandeis wrote
that "federal common law" governed a dispute over the apportionment of
an interstate stream." The existence of federal common law in a number
of substantive areas, such as interstate disputes and admiralty matters, today
is well-established. 6 The simultaneous development of Erie and the "new"
federal common law reflects the tension between federal and state interests
in the American constitutional order.
Although much discussed, 7 the precise scope of federal common law
remains largely uncertain." Specifically, despite few apparent differences
between the statutes in question, the Supreme Court has vacillated between
finding that some statutes passed by Congress delegate authority to the
courts to make federal common law and others afford no such power. 9
Such discontinuity should not be surprising. When viewed in light of the
Constitution, federal common law indeed is peculiar. The making of law
through the common law method by the federal judiciary seems at odds
12. When discussing federal common law, most commentators primarily focus on sepa-
ration of powers and federalism concerns. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 6.1, at 296 (1989); Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HALV.
L. REV. 881, 931 (1986); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1, 1-2, 13-23 (1985); Mishkin, Some Further Last Words of Erie-The Thread, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1682, 1683 (1974).
13. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
14. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 693, 695 (1974).
15. See Hinderlinder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41; see also Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures
of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. RE. 1130, 1167-76 (1986) (describing general contours of
federal common law as it has developed).
17. See, e.g., Field, supra note 12 (advocating broad view of federal common law);
Merrill, supra note 12 (advocating narrow view of federal common law). For a debate about
the constitutional and statutory legitimacy of federal common law, see the lively colloquy
between Professors Redish and Weinberg in Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legiti-
macy, and the Interpretative Process: An "'Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV.
761 (1989); Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. Rv. 805 (1989); Redish, Federal
Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw.
U.L. REv. 853 (1989); Weinberg, The Curious Notion That the Rules of Decision Act Blocks
Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 860 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Curious
Notion].
18. See E. CHEmEnSKY, supra note 12, § 6.1, at 297; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAl.
COURTs § 60, at 388-89 (4th ed. 1983).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 62-72.
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with separation of powers principles and the idea that Congress has the
exclusive constitutional authority to enact laws. The discretionary power of
the federal courts to federalize certain substantive areas of law also creates
the potential for displacement of state authority, thus undercutting feder-
alism values.Y° Finally, federal common law implicates the age-old jurispru-
dential query whether limits exist that prevent lawmaking by judicial fiat.
When the judiciary is called upon to apply federal statutes, a species
of federal common law frequently referred to as interstitial lawmaking2'
comes into play. Congress almost invariably leaves gaps in laws it enacts
that the courts feel compelled to fill.22 A prototypical example of interstitial
lawmaking is adding a limitations period to a federal statute lacking one. 2
Rather than the ordinary task of interpreting the text of a statute, the court
fills in the blanks left by Congress in the statutory language. Consequently,
the task of interstitial lawmaking differs somewhat from traditional statutory
interpretation.-
When making law at the interstices, the federal courts in many instances,
though largely without analysis, traditionally "borrowed" or "absorbed"
state law. Because a legislature of some sort, although not Congress, passed
the law, such a practice arguably alleviates to some degree separation of
powers concerns. At the same time, application of state law may seem to
limit intrusions on state interests and restrict the scope of judicial lawmaking
discretion.
The judicial function of "amending" statutes by supplementing their
terms raises several questions that will be discussed here. Assuming that the
federal judiciary legitimately may fill gaps in statutes, are the courts com-
20. See infra text accompanying notes 33-73, 312-33.
21. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discre-
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
22. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
(emphasizing that "the inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that
interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts."); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (positing that "I recognize without
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular motions"); Mishkin, supra note 21, at 800 (stating that,
"[a]t the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal
courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules which may be
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the
large by Congress").
23. See infra text accompanying notes 75-237.
24. Some, however, see federal common law as little different from statutory or consti-
tutional construction. See Field, supra note 12, at 890-96; Westen & Lehman, Is There Life
for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REv. 311, 332 (1980); see also Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (observing that "[biroadly
worded constitutional and statutory provisions necessarily have been given concrete meaning
and application by a process of case-by-case judicial decision in the common-law tradition");
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1975) (discussing constitutional common law).
INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING
pelled by principles of federalism, or the Rules of Decision Act, 25 to utilize
state law to limit improper intrusion upon state prerogative? More funda-
mentally, from an institutional perspective, is it a proper function for the
judiciary restrained by separation of powers principles in the federal system
to supplement laws passed by Congress? Finally, regardless of constitutional
or statutory concerns, should the federal courts be compelled to apply state
law to restrict their power in making law?
In analyzing these questions, this Article articulates some thoughts about
the Supreme Court's approach to interstitial lawmaking in the federal
securities realm. Students of the federal securities laws are well aware, of
the many gaps in the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress. The courts
frequently are called upon to remedy those deficiencies. Last Term, the
Supreme Court attempted to fill some of those voids in two cases and
reached what might appear to be incongruous results. In Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,26 the Court declined to "borrow"
state law, but found that provisions from federal law should be utilized to
fill a void in the statute. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. ,27
the Court concluded that state law should be. Although both decisions may
be correct as a matter of policy, the Court in both denied that it was
engaged in policymaking.
To place these cases in perspective, Part I of the Article offers some
background on federal common law. Part II discusses the problems ad-
dressed in Lampf, Pleva and Kamen and the implications of the Court's
decisions. Part III suggests some of the forces at work in the Supreme
Court's federal common law jurisprudence. First, the Court, by creating
the presumption that federal courts should borrow. state law when making
federal common law, furthers deeply engrained federalism principles re-
flected in, if not required by, the Rules of Decision Act . 2 National interests
compete for primacy with, and sometimes prevail over, state interests. 29
Second, the Court is influenced by separation of powers principles and the
fear that the judiciary in certain instances is not constitutionally competent
to fashion federal common law.3 0 Finally, the Court's decisions reflect the
longstanding jurisprudential concern with, limitless lawmaking and the ac-
companying potential for judicial tyranny. To that end, compulsory incor-
poration of state law into deficient federal law may serve to restrain the
25. The Rules of Decision Act, originally Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1
Stat. 92, is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988); see infra note 80 (quoting Act).
26. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
27. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 312-33.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 312-33. See generally Fallon, The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141 (1988) (describing competing "Federalist" and
"Nationalist" models of judicial federalism and tracing theories in decisions in several areas
of federal courts lav).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 334-52.
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lawmaking powers of the courts. Although these competing values cannot
dictate results, 3' they assist in explaining the Court's decisions.
This Article suggests that, when engaged in interstitial lawmaking, the
Supreme Court should simplify the inquiry. Neither the Constitution nor
statute require the federal courts to resort to state law to fill gaps in a
federal statute. To the contrary, in order to ensure effective implementation
of a national program, the judiciary has the constitutional and statutory
responsibility to fashion the best interstitial law possible. When filling the
void in a federal law passed by Congress, there is no true federalism interest
in need of protection. Nor does the borrowing of state law effectively limit
judicial lawmaking in a meaningful way. Such borrowing leaves open a
variety of options to the federal courts and thus fails to restrict significantly
judicial discretion. More importantly, blind reliance on state law at times
has undermined the effectiveness of laws passed by Congress.
For similar reasons, the courts are not bound to borrow from another
federal statute. The courts instead should fashion the best law for the
particular statute in light of its purposes. Passage by some legislature,
federal or state, does not necessarily mean that a provision, borrowed from
a different statute passed under different circumstances to address different
problems, will effectively serve the goals of the deficient statute.
To fulfill Congressional intent, the Court should make the law-possibly
but not necessarily from a state or federal source-that best fulfills the
needs and purposes of the particular statute in question. This is particularly
true with respect to the federal securities laws, enacted by Congress in an
attempt to create a national regulatory scheme to cure deficiencies with
state regulation of the interstate securities markets.3 2 Because state law at
times has proven to be a poor source for filling the gaps in the federal
securities laws, the Supreme Court's frequent endorsement of state law as
presumptively applicable has led to results that unnecessarily conflict with
legitimate federal interests. In addition, borrowing provisions from the
federal securities laws, while an improvement over state law borrowing in
some circumstances, may lead to results not in keeping with the purposes
of the particular statutory provision in question.
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW: VACILLATION BETWEEN EXTREMES
Although the federal courts engaged in the making of common law
long before 1938, a new chapter of federal common law commenced with
Erie.33 The parameters of the common law power of the federal courts,
however, never have been clear. Although some have attempted to define
31. See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, § 6.1, at 297.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 121-56.
33. See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING
and circumscribe federal common law,34 this Article modestly attempts to
identify three influences-federalism, separation of powers, and jurispru-
dential concerns-in competition for primacy in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in this area.3 5 Recognition of these influences will assist in explaining
recent developments in the Court's attempts to fill the gaps of the federal
securities laws and offer a prescription for the future.
Federal common law is well-established in a number of substantive
areas, including interstate disputes,36 admiralty and maritime matters,
37
international relations, 3 matters involving Indian tribes,3 9 and liability of
the United States government. 4° Because none of these areas of peculiarly
national concern would seem appropriate for regulation by the various
states, necessity almost compels that federal law govern. 4'
The substance of the federal common law in these areas, however, is a
separate question from whether federal law should govern.42 Congress in a
few areas has expressly instructed the federal courts to incorporate state
law as the federal rule of decision. 43 In addition, the courts sometimes
borrow state law, not only as a matter of convenience, but also possibly
because of federalism's strong influence.44 Perhaps most common is for the
34. See Field, supra note 12, at 890 (stating that 'federal common law' ... refer[s] to
any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional") (emphasis in original omit-
ted); Merrill, supra note 12, at 5 ('Federal common law' . . . means any federal rule of
decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text.. ").
35. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (criticizing potential for "judicial inventiveness" in making of federal common
law); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316-17 (1947) (refusing to create federal
common law rule because judicial lawmaking "would be intruding within a field properly
within Congress's control"); McCluny v. Sulliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830) (holding
that Rules of Decision Act required "borrowing" of state limitations period for federal statute
lacking one).
36. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
37. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); see also M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13847 (2d ed. 1990)
(arguing that federal common law should be limited to admiralty and maritime cases).
38. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
39. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
41. See E. CnmEsRiNsKy, supra note 12, § 6.1, at 295; see, e.g., County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (referring to federal common law as "'necessary
expedient"') (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981)).
42. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (noting that,
when selecting federal common law rule, Court has "occasionally selected state law"); United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (observing that "state law may be
incorporated as the federal rule of decision"). But see Field, supra note 12, at 885-90, 950-82
(criticizing this approach and arguing that, if state law is appropriate source, then federal
common law is unnecessary).
43. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1988); see also
Mishkin, supra note 21, at 797 (noting that when federal statute requires reference to state
law, "it would generally seem to conclude the matter") (footnote omitted).
44. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (considering, after finding federal common law
1991]
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courts to fashion uniquely federal law from state and other sources.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,45 which indicates both the Court's
limitation of Erie and the Court's willingness to fashion federal common
law, is perhaps the most famous federal common law case. In Clearfield
Trust, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, one of the leading architects of
the new federal common law,46 the Court held that the Erie doctrine was
irrelevant and that federal common law, not state law, governed the ability
of the United States to recover for fraud involving commercial paper issued
by it. In so holding, the Court emphasized that, because of the national
scale of the federal government's issuance of commercial paper, the appli-
cation of state law would result in "exceptional uncertainty" and "great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries
of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is
plain.' '48
The Court has vacillated about the propriety of federal common law in
a number of areas. The odyssey of one dispute reflects that vacillation, or
applicable, "[wlhether to adopt state law [as] a matter of judicial policy"); DeSylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (following state definition of "children" for purposes
of Copyright Act because state, unlike federal, law on definition was well-developed). But cf.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (declining to adopt state definition of "sicurity"
for purposes of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
45. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
46. Justice Douglas' apparent enthusiasm for federal common law may have been fueled
by his extensive experience in federal government during the New Deal, see W. DOUGLAS, Go
EAST, YOUNG MAN 257-376 (1974), and his belief that many of the nation's financial ills were
national in scope, see generally W. DOUGLAS, DEMocRAcY AND FiNANcE (1940).
47. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); see also
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (refusing to apply state
law to dispute involving United States government). In so holding, the Court was succinct:
the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply to this action. The rights and
duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law .... The authority to issue the check had its origin
in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent
on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state. The duties imposed upon the
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their
roots in the same federal sources. In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is
for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards.
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 18, § 60, at 394 (remarking that "[tihe Erie doctrine does not
apply, and the federal court has much more freedom, where the state rule has merely been
absorbed as the relevant federal rule").
48. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367; see also Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (considering
need for uniformity, or lack thereof, when deciding whether state law should serve as source
of federal common law). In contrast to Clearfield Trust, when federal interests are simply
implicated in disputes between private parties, the Court has been less likely to find that
federal common law governed. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977);
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1966); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956).
INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING
perhaps the changing views, of the Court about federal common law. In
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 9 Justice Douglas concluded for a unanimous
Court that a cause of action for pollution of Lake Michigan was available
under federal common law. Although recognizing that Congress did not
create the claim,5 0 the Court emphasized that Congressionally-created rem-
edies "are not necessarily the only federal remedies *available."'"
That, however, was not the last word in that particular dispute. Congress
subsequently passed a statute 2 which the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, found to preclude federal common law remedies for pollution
of the lake.5 3 The opinion on the second go-round is considerably more
deferential to a blend of separation of powers and federalism objections to
federal common lawmaking:
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply
their own rules of decision .... The enactment of a federal rule in
an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace
state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary,
purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people
through their elected representatives in Congress .... Erie recog-
nized as much in ruling that a federal court could not generally
apply a federal rule of decision, despite the existence of jlrisdiction,
in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.1
4
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.5 5 is the Court's latest comprehensive
word on federal common law and exemplifies the recurring debate. In that
case, Justice Scalia wrote for a five-four majority holding that federal
common law governed a products liability claim against a military contractor
that manufactured a product for the federal government. The Court em-
phasized that federal common law governed a narrow category of cases
implicating such "'uniquely federal interests' that "state law is pre-empted
and replaced. ' 56 Finding a uniquely federal interest implicated in the dispute
and a potential conflict between state and federal law, the Court held that
49. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
50. See id. at 101-03.
51. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
52. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972).
53. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
54. Id. at 312-13 (citations omitted).
55. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
56. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted). A detailed historical analysis places in
question the generally accepted view that the framers of the Constitution intended the scope
of federal common law to be quite limited. See Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
Two, 133 U. PA. L. Rav. 1231 (1985); Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (1985).
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state law was "displaced. ' 57 The Court further concluded that, under federal
law, the military contractor was immune from liability for products man-
ufactured for the federal government.5 8
Objecting in separation of powers and federalism refrains ordinarily
found in the opinions of more conservative Justices, Justice Brennan dis-
sented. 9 Emphasizing that the Court lacked constitutional authority, as well
as the expertise, to adopt the immunity rule, he "would leave that exercise
of legislative power to Congress, where our Constitution places it."' 6 Justice
Brennan also articulated concern with "deeply rooted notions of federalism"
implicated by the federal judiciary's displacement of state law .6
Consistent with the apparent inconsistency in the Court's decisions, the
Court has exhibited ambivalent tendencies in the interpretation of federal
statutes in determining whether the laws authorize the judiciary to make
federal common law. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,62 for
example, the Court seemed eager to find broad delegations of federal
57. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506-07, 511-12 (discussing possible conflict between state law
and exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which shields government
employees from tort liability for exercise of discretionary functions); see also Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1597, 1629 (1991)
(finding Justice Scalia's reading of Federal Tort Claims Act as pre-empting state law in Boyle
difficult to reconcile with his general technique of interpreting statutes by looking almost
exclusively to statutory text).
58. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. This judicially-created immunity has been criticized on
policy grounds. See, e.g., Cass & Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual
Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REv. 257 (1991); Green & Matasar, The Supreme Court
and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle's Government Contractor Defense, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 637 (1990); see also Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction
Scholarship: Does Doctrine Matter When Law is Politics? (Book Review), 89 MICH. L. Rv.
1499, 1512 (1991) ("Boyle is inconsistent with federal courts doctrine. Its result makes sense
only through an ideological lens."). Because the Court, not Congress, made the decision to
immunize military contractors, Justice Scalia's approach in Boyle seems at odds with his strict
separation of powers views. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 425-26 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 709 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
An example of broad federal common lawmaking from last Term is Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), in which a five-four majority held that the federal courts possessed
the "inherent power" to assess sanctions for a party's bad faith conduct in a diversity action
even though such sanctions were not permitted under the law of the forum state. The majority
seemed unfazed by separation of powers and federalism questions, including the Erie problem,
see id. at 2137, which Justice Kennedy focused upon in dissent, see id. at 2148 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (applying judicially
made doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss action although constitutional and statutory
jurisdictional and other requirements for suit in federal court had been satisfied).
59. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting campaign of govern-
ment contractors seeking protective legislation and accusing Court "unelected and unaccount-
able to the people" of "unabashedly step[ping] into the breach to legislate a rule denying ...
compensation that state law assures").
60. Id. at 516. Justice Stevens also voiced separation of powers objections to the making
of federal common law in this instance. See id. at 531-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see id. at 517-18 (emphasizing
similar concerns).
62. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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lawmaking power resonating from a statute. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Douglas, held that the Labor Management Relations Act, 63 which
provides for federal jurisdiction over disputes concerning collective bargain-
ing agreements, permitted the courts to develop an entire body of federal
common law of labor contracts.6 4 The Court emphasized that "lilt is not
uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights
are concerned." 6 Nor did the Court seem to fear, but in fact seemed to
relish, the potential free-wheeling nature of judicial lawmaking: "[t]he range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.
'6
Voicing federalism and separation of power concerns, Justice Frank-
furter dissented. In his eyes, the majority brought "into conflict state law
and federal law, state courts and federal courts."7 Concerned with judicial
lawmaking, Justice Frankfurter criticized the
casting upon the federal courts, with no guides except "judicial
inventiveness," the task of applying a whole industrial code that is
as yet in the bosom of the judiciary. There are severe limits on
"judicial inventiveness" even for the most imaginative judges. The
law is not a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," . . . and it cannot
be drawn from there like nitrogen from air.
66
In more recent years, the Court has adhered to the views of Justice
Frankfurter more closely than those of Justice Douglas and has been hesitant
to read a statute as authorizing federal common lawmaking. For example,
in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. ,69 a unanimous Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, refused to fashion a right to
contribution under the antitrust laws.70 The Court found that, because
uniquely federal interests were not at stake and because Congress did not
63. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1988)).
64. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
65. Id. at 457 (citing, inter alia, Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943)); see Friendly, supra note 33, at 413-21 (noting various areas that, under rationale of
Lincoln Mills, might benefit from federal common lawmaking).
66. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (citation omitted). For pointed criticism of Lincoln
Mills, see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HAgv. L. REv. 1 (1957).
67. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
69. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
70. See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-99
(1981) (refusing to fashion federal common law right to contribution under Equal Pay Act
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Some commentators criticize Texas Industries. See, e.g., Field, supra note 12, at 889-90
n.28, 892 n.39, 911-12 n.140, 940 n.244; Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a
Case, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 573, 600, 614-15 (1985). The decision seems anomalous in light
of the Court's previous holding that the Sherman Act's "legislative history makes it perfectly
clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition." National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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delegate the power, the federal courts could not fashion a federal common
law of contribution under the statute. 7' Because of the perceived lack of
judicial competence to resolve the complexities of the issue, the Court
emphasized separation of powers concerns and that Congress, not the courts,
is the lawmaker in the American constitutional order. 72
In sum, the influence of federalism, separation of powers and fear of
judicial lawmaking are evident in some, though not all, of the Supreme
Court's federal common law decisions. The Court's differences in emphasis
may be explained by the shifting views about whether national interests
predominated over state interests, differing degrees of discomfort with the
separation of powers implications of federal common lawmaking, and
varying levels of concern with "judicial inventiveness." 73 The Court's de-
terminations concerning whether Congressional enactments delegate federal
common lawmaking authority to the courts also mirror these competing
tendencies.
II. FILLING THE GAPS IN THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
In the 1990 Term, the Supreme Court decided two cases in which the
lower courts had filled gaps left by Congress in the federal securities laws.74
In one case, the Court reversed the decision to fill the interstices with state
law and held that the lower court should have applied federal law. In the
other, the Court reversed a decision to fashion federal law and held that
the lower court should have applied state law.
A. The Statute of Limitations Missing From Section 10(b)
Congress enacts many federal statutes that expressly or impliedly create
rights of action but fall to provide an accompanying statute of limitations.
75
Despite the omission, the Supreme Court generally has been unwilling to
permit a federal claim to go without a limitations period:
71. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 634-46; see also id. at 641 (stating that federal
common law "exists only in ... narrow areas").
72. See id. at 646-47.
73. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
74. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991);
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991). In a similar fashion, the Court
last Term elaborated on various requirements for actions under the federal securities laws with
little help from the statutory text or legislative history. See Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (1991) (holding that shareholder failed to establish causation of damages
necessary to establish an implied right of action under § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act and
Securities & Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9); Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991)
(analyzing standing requirement for actions under § 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act).
75. See American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report
of the Task Force on Statutes of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAW. 645 (1986);
Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State
Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011 (1980); see also Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980) (noting that lack of limitations period is "void which is
commonplace in federal statutory law").
INTERSTITIAL LA WMAKING
A federal cause of action "brought at any distance of time" would
be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." . . . Just deter-
minations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of
time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In
compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume
that their sins may be forgotten. 76
To serve those purposes, firmly established rules are a necessity.77 However,
besides consuming inordinate amounts of time of the litigants and the
judiciary, the efforts of the federal courts to articulate clear limitations
rules instead have caused considerable uncertainty and confusion.
7 8
Much of the difficulty comes in ascertaining which limitations period
to incorporate into the deficient federal statute. Over 160 years ago, in
McCluny v. Sulliman,7 9 the Supreme Court held that the Rules of Decision
Act 0 mandated federal courts to apply a state statute of limitations when
a federal law lacked one. Since then, courts almost reflexively have "bor-
rowed" or "absorbed" the limitations period applicable to the state cause
of action "most analogous" to the federal claim."' At various times,
76. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 336, 341 (1805)); see, e.g., Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (emphasizing
that "[s]tatutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and they are favored in the
law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence."); Bell v.
Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) (referring to statute of limitations as "wise and
beneficial law ... to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction
may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal
of witnesses"). See generally H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF AcTIONS AT LAW
AND IN EQUITY §§ 1-5, at 1-7 (3d ed. J. Gould, 1901); Special Project, supra note 75, at 1016-
18; Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.' L. Rnv. 1177, 1185-86
(1950). But see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (declining to apply
state statute of limitations to federal claim and finding no limitations periods governing such
claims).
77. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(remarking that "[flew areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied
rules than does the subject of period of limitations").
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79-237 & supra note 75 (citing authorities).
79. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830).
80. See 1 Stat. 92, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Act provides that
[tihe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as the rules of decisions in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.
Id.
81. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966) (collecting authority); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 613-18 (1895).
Critical of the practice of borrowing state limitations periods, the Federal Courts Study
Committee recommended in 1990 that Congress adopt limitation periods for major federal
claims that lack one and "falback limitations periods" for claims implied by the courts. See
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 93
(1990). Congress later partially implemented the recommendation. Section 313(a) of the Federal
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however, the Court deviated from that course and looked to federal law to
answer limitations questions when it determined that state law in some way
conflicted with federal policy. 2 Such treatment is suggested by the preemp-
tion doctrine founded in the Supremacy Clause. 3
Besides federalism concerns reflected in the Rules of Decision Act, the
arbitrary nature of statutes of limitations might favor reliance on the law
passed by a state legislature, a sentiment indicative of discomfort with
judicial lawmaking. 4 Still, one might think it anomalous to worry about
whether to apply a state statute of limitations when, in certain areas, the
Supreme Court has given the lower courts carte blanche to displace state
law and fashion entire bodies of substantive federal common law out of
whole cloth.85 Nevertheless, consistent with its federal common law decisions,
the Supreme Court's decisions adding limitations periods to federal statutes
reflect competition between federalism, separation of powers and jurispru-
dential concerns.
1. An Increased Willingness to "Federalize" Limitations Law?
Forced by legislative omission to divine limitations periods for increasing
numbers of federal statutes, the Supreme Court in recent years repeatedly
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, which is part of the umbrella Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114, provides that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress after the date of
the enactment of this section [December 1, 1990] may not be commenced later than 4 years
after the cause of action accrues." See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 (West 1991). Congress apparently
was reluctant to disturb well-established 'limitations provisions previously fashioned by the
courts. See H. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6870.
82. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (declining to apply state
statute of limitations to federal claim); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221,
224 (1958) (same); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1946) (refusing to apply
state statute of limitations to federal equitable claim); see also Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 534 (1954) (reporting that "growing body of
federal decisions are finding in the interstices of federal legislation an authorization to develop
uniform decisional rules governing many kinds of legal relations between private persons").
83. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991) (stating that "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause .. ., state laws that
'interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution'
are invalid") (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)). See
generally L. TRBE, supra note 6, §§ 6-26 to 6-29, at 481-511.
84. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966); Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 769 (1986); Hill,
State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HAiv. L. REv. 66, 94 (1955); see
also Mishkin, supra note 21, at 803-04 (remarking that "there may be situations where state
law is chosen only because of special difficulty in the judicial framing of a definite federal
rule on a specific issue in an area otherwise totally national") (footnote omitted). For an
interesting discussion of the view that judges should borrow state statutes of limitations to
avoid the appearance of arbitrariness appropriate for legislatures but not the courts, see Judge
Posner's concurring opinion in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th
Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (discussing Lincoln Mills).
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addressed the question. With little hint of any overall direction, the Court
has drifted back and forth between the borrowing of state or federal law.
8 6
Several generalizations, however, may be made. The Court in the 1980s
appeared more willing than in the past to deviate from the traditional
borrowing of state statutes and to borrow limitations periods from other
federal laws. Nonetheless, in deference to federalism concerns, the Court
repeatedly emphasized the continued vitality of the conventional wisdom
about the presumptive borrowing of state limitations periods. Considering
many federal as well as state alternatives, the Court always selected a
limitations period passed by a state or federal legislature. The Court never
endeavored to fashion a limitations period designed specifically for the
particular federal statute in question.
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,87 the Supreme
Court in 1983 rejected rigid adherence to borrowing state limitations periods
for federal statutes and instead applied a time limit from another federal
statute."8 Rejecting outright McCluny v. Sulliman's conclusion that the Rules
of Decision Act required application of a state limitations period, 9 the
Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended the borrowing of
state law inconsistent with federal lawP9 Consequently, the Court accepted
the displacement of state law "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a signif-
icantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."91 The Court
86. For a discussion of recent developments in the Court's statute of limitations juris-
prudence concluding that the Court moved to minimize the costs of borrowing state limitations
law, see Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DhmE L. REv. 693 (1988).
87. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
88. In a previous decision involving a similar claim, the Court, although reserving the
question whether a federal limitations period should apply, had selected between two state
statutes of limitations and analyzed which state claim was most analogous to the federal claim.
See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
89. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
In so holding, the Court emphasized that the Act
authorizes application of state law only when federal law does not "otherwise require
or provide." . . . [Tihe choice of a limitations period for a federal cause of action
is itself a question of federal law. If the answer to that question (based on the
policies and requirements of the underlying cause of action) is that a timeliness rule
drawn from elsewhere in federal law should be applied, then the Rules of Decision
Act is inapplicable by its own terms.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Westen & Lehman, supra note 24, at 369-
77 (characterizing argument that Rules of Decision Act prohibits federal common law contrary
to state rules as "absurd"). The Court's conclusion has been criticized by some as contrary
to the Rules of Decision Act. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 703-04 ; Burbank, supra note
84, at 759-62; Merrill, supra note 12, at 30-33; see also M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 119-25
(criticizing development of most federal common law as contrary to Rules of Decision Act
and general principles of federalism).
90. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161.
91. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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concluded that, because a uniform limitations period from a related federal
labor statute would further federal policies in a way that state law had not,
the federal limitations period from that statute should apply to another
federal labor statute. 92 Despite rejecting state law in this circumstance, the
Court cautioned that "state law remains the norm for borrowing of limi-
tations periods." Indeed, the Court stated that previous decisions "generally
concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most analogous
statute of limitations under state law."
'93
Despite the borrowing of federal rather than state law in DelCostello,
the Court in 1989 in Reed v. United Transportation Union94 applied a state
limitations period to a claim that a union and various officers violated a
member's free speech rights guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act. 9 It described DelCostello as "a closely circumscribed
exception" to the general state law borrowing doctrine.96 Finding the claim
analogous to a state personal injury action and that state limitations periods
would not frustrate national labor policy, the Court refused to borrow a
limitations period from the same federal labor statute utilized in Del-
Costello97 and instead applied a state personal injury statute of limitations.98
As Reed and other decisions make evident, the Court takes to heart
DelCostello's emphasis that state law normally is the source for a limitations
period. In 1985 in Wilson v. Garcia,9 9 the Court adhered to standard
practice and held that courts should borrow the forum state's limitations
period for personal injury actions for federal civil rights claims under
Section 1983.100 The Court found that state personal injury statutes would
92. See id. at 165-69. The Court held that, rather than borrowing a limitations period
from state law, the six-month limitations period for filing an unfair labor practice charge
under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 10(b), should apply to claims against
unions for breach of the duty of fair representation and against employers for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169.
93. See id. at 158 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court admitted that Congress
ordinarily failed in these circumstances to consider the limitations question but "that, absent
some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow their
previous practice of borrowing state provisions." Id. at 158-59 n.12 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
Justice Stevens dissented and claimed that, because federal law did not "otherwise require
or provide," the Rules of Decision Act compelled application of state law. See id. at 172-73
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He emphasized that "[flor the past century federal judges have
'borrowed' state statutes of limitations, not because they thought it was a sensible form of
'interstitial lawmaking,' but rather because they were directed to do so by the Congress of the
United States." Id. at 172-73 (footnote omitted).
94. 488 U.S. 319 (1989).
95. See id. at 334.
96. Id. at 324.
97. See id. at 332-33.
98. See id. at 325-29.
99. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). Justice Stevens, who dissented in DelCostello, see supra note
93, wrote the opinion for the Court.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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provide the necessary uniformity and that federal interests did not mandate
national uniformity.'0' Rejecting other potential statutes of limitations for
state law claims as inconsistent with federal law, 1°2 the Court held that a
federal civil rights claim was most analogous to a state personal injury
claim and thus that the personal injury limitations period was the "best
alternative available.'
0 3
The Court soon learned that the solution of Wilson v. Garcia was more
complicated than it may have at first seemed. Facing numerous statutes of
limitations in the same state for different types of personal injury actions,
the Court in Owens v. Okure°4 held that the courts should borrow the
general or residual personal injury statute of limitations. The policy rationale
offered by the Court for that selection was that the statute of limitations
could be "readily ascertain[ed], with little risk of confusion or unpredicta-
bility." 5 Because of the wide variety of Section 1983 claims, the Court
rejected a limitations period applicable to intentional personal injury claims.1 6
In contrast, the Court turned federal in adding a limitations period to
another federal statute. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Asso-
ciates,0 7 the Court selected the proper limitations period for civil actions
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 08 The Court reiterated DelCostello's holding that the Rules of
Decision Act did not mandate application of state limitations periods. °9
Nonetheless, the Court still suggested that the Act ordinarily required
application of state statutes of limitation and that borrowing federal law is
a narrow exception to this general rule." 0 Moreover, presuming Congres-
sional awareness of the application of state limitations periods, the Court
reasoned, as it did in DelCostello, that to borrow state law ordinarily is
consistent with the intent of Congress."'
The Court recognized the difficulties encountered in attempting to find
a state claim analogous to a RICO claim, which may be predicated on
offenses running the gamut from arson to securities fraud." 2 Finding a
101. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
102. See id. at 278-79. The Court rejected catchall limitations periods and those governing
claims based on misconduct by state officials. See id. at 276.
103. Id. at 276 (citation omitted); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,
660-64 (1987) (plurality opinion) (extending Wilson v. Garcia to discrimination claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and holding that state personal injury statutes of limitations applied).
104. 488 U.S. 235, 243-48 (1989).
105. Id. at 248.
106. See id. at 249-50 & n.ll.
107. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
108. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968).
109. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. at 146.
110. See id. at 147-48.
Il. See id. at 147. But see infra text accompanying notes 338-52 (discussing Congress's
lack of knowledge of court decisions on issues lacking public controversy).
112. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149. The Court observed that
[s]ome courts have simply used the state limitations period most similar to the
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"confused, inconsistent, and unpredictable" set of limitations rules,"' the
Court concluded that a uniform limitations period was necessary." 4 The
need for uniformity was particularly acute because the multistate nature of
the transactions giving rise to RICO liability created the potential for forum
shopping if state limitations periods were borrowed." 5 The Court concluded
that federal policies and the practicalities of litigation provided "compelling
reasons for federal pre-emption" of state law." 6 Besides rejecting the
application of state limitations periods, the Court refused to borrow a five
year statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions under RICO'' because
in its view a federal antitrust statute, the Clayton Act, offered a "better
federal law analogy."" 8 Consequently, the Court adopted the four year
statute of limitations from the Clayton Act.' 9
In light of the shift from state to federal and so on, it is difficult to
discern a definite pattern to the Court's recent decisions concerning selection
of a limitations period. However, as DelCostello and Agency Holding
predicate offenses alleged in the particular RICO claim .... Others ... have chosen
a uniform statute of limitations applicable to all civil RICO actions brought within
a given state .... The courts, however, have uniformly looked to state statutes of
limitations rather than a federal uniform statute of limitations.
Id. at 148-49 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
114. See id. at 149; see also International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 712 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)
(objecting to use of state statute of limitations for federal claim and arguing for uniform
limitations period to avoid "unnecessary complexities and opportunities for vexatious litiga-
tion").
115. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 154 (remarking that "[t]he multistate nature of
RICO indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility
of multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum
shopping . . .") (citations omitted). The Court distinguished Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985), on the ground that "the typical § 1983 suit, in which there need not be any nexus to
interstate commerce, . . . most commonly involves a dispute wholly in one State." Agency
Holding, 483 U.S. at 154; see supra text accompanying notes 99-103 (discussing Wilson v.
Garcia).
116. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 153.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (requiring indictment within five years of commission of
offense).
118. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 155-56. Because Congress apparently modelled RICO
after the Clayton Act and intended to duplicate the Act's enforcement scheme in the new law,
the Court intimated that Congress intended the Clayton Act's limitations period to apply to
RICO claims. See id. at 150-51.
119. See id. at 156. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. See id. at 170 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). Claiming that the Court was taking a "giant leap into the realm of
legislative judgments," id. at 157, see id. at 169, Justice Scalia stated that he would apply
state limitations law unless inconsistent with the federal statute and in that event would apply
no limitations period, see id. at 163-64. Justice Scalia accused the majority of "prowling
hungrily through the Statutes at Large for an appetizing federal limitations period, and
pouncing on the Clayton Act." Id. at 166; see also Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S.
319, 334 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (reiterating "view that the Court should
apply the appropriate state statute of limitations (if any at all) when a federal statute lacks
an explicit limitations period").
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suggest, the Court appeared more willing than in the past to select a
limitations period from another federal statute enacted by Congress rather
than a law passed by a state legislature. The Court unequivocally rejected
the federalism concerns embodied in the Rules of Decision Act as mandating
the "borrowing" of state law. It, however, repeated that the Act generally
requires the application of state limitations periods. To address separation
of powers concerns, the Court at times resorted to the fiction that, in light
of the well-established rule mandating the borrowing of state limitations
periods, Congress generally must have intended that state law apply.
In the end, the Court in each case had a range of alternative limitation,
periods from which to choose. The test originally formulated in DelCostello,
and applied in Agency Holding, expressly weighed the federal policies
implicated as well as the practicalities of litigation under the particular
federal statute. Such a vague test places minimal constraints on the Court's
power to select a limitations period. Indeed, in borrowing a federal limi-
tations period, the Court in Agency Holding refused to apply a limitations
period applicable to another claim in the very same statute in question but
instead looked to another federal law. 20 Nonetheless, concern with the
outright appearance of judicial lawmaking may have deterred the Court
from considering whether to fashion the best limitations period for the
statute in question-that is, one separate and apart from a limitations period
enacted by a state or federal legislature.
2. A Federal Limitations Period for Section 10(b)
A provision of a federal statute central to the national system of
securities regulation, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,121
lacks a limitations period, as well as an express private right of action.
Designed to deal with fraudulent, misleading and deceptive practices in the
trading of securities on the national market,122 the Act, along with the
Securities Act of 1933,121 sought to remedy the shortfalls of state laws
120. Consequently, Agency Holding seems somewhat inconsistent with the Court's recent
decision in Lampf, Pleva in which the Court found that a limitations period for an express
claim under a federal statute also applied to a claim implied into that same statute. See infra
text accompanying notes 157-237.
121. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
7811 (1988); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-7811 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990)). Section 10(b) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), makes it unlawful for any person:
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
122. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988) (stating that Act
was designed to "perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities"); 1 L.
Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcturrrs REGULATON 148-52 (3d ed. 1989).
123. See Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1988)).
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(without completely preempting state regulation of the field) and to create
a minimum disclosure and anti-fraud scheme governing interstate securities
transactions. 24 To enforce Section 10(b)'s provisions, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated the now-famous Rule 10b-5.
25
"[Jiudicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the
passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action
exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and constitutes an essential
tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements.'
'1 26
When courts imply a right of action in a statute, many questions often
arise concerning the parameters of the claim. 27 As an implied right of
action, it is not surprising that Section 10(b) lacks a statute of limitations.
Assuming that a limitations period must be supplied,' 28 the next question is
which is the appropriate limitations period, a subject of considerable liti-
gation and commentary. 29
124. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988); Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983); 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 148-52,
221.
125. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), in relevant part, provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national security exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with purchase or sale of any security.
126. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). The Court adheres to that view
even though over the last two decades it has exhibited considerable resistance to implying
private rights of action into the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (§ 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act); see also Frankel,
Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981) (discussing costs and benefits of implied
rights of action under federal securities laws). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-82 (1982) (implying cause of action into Commodity
Exchange Act).
127. See generally P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISBKIN, & D. SIAPImO, HART & WEcIs-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 943-50 (3d ed. 1988). As in federal
common law decisions generally, separation of powers issues arise frequently in implying rights
of action into federal statutes. Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 374-82 (1982) (rejecting separation of powers arguments and implying cause of
action into statute), with Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (focusing on Congressional intent
in deciding not to imply right of action into statute).
128. 1 assume here that the federal courts should supply a limitations period to a statute
lacking one. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78 (reviewing reasons favoring adding
statute of limitations to deficient federal statute). However, if one believes (as Justice Scalia
seems to) that Congress may be forced to act if courts do not fill such statutory gaps, see
infra text accompanying notes 334-52 (discussing separation of powers objections to interstitial
lawmaking), then it may be unwise to add a limitations period.
129. See, e.g., Guin & Donaldson, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
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With little analysis of the specific purposes of the federal securities
laws, the lower courts until recent years generally followed the traditional
rule and borrowed a state limitations period for Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 claims. 30 That is true even though the claims were by definition
interstate 3' and the securities transactions at issue frequently involved con-
duct and actors in numerous states. 3 2 In borrowing state law, there was
some disagreement among the lower courts about what the "most analo-
gous" state law claim was to a cause of action under Section 10(b). Courts
commonly found either state fraud or Blue Sky claims to be most analogous
and therefore borrowed state limitations periods applicable to those state
law causes of action. 33 The result was a considerable variety of limitations
periods applied to the same type of claim and-similar alleged misconduct.
The limitations periods applied to Section 10(b) actions ranged at various
times from one (Maryland) to ten years (Tennessee).
134
Besides spawning an abundance of litigation, the variation of state
statutes of limitation applied to Section 10(b) caused a significant lack of
uniformity and certainty. 35 Commentators appeared to be near unanimous
on the need for a uniform federal limitations period. 36 Numerous reasons
Act of 1988: Has Congress Supplied a Limitations Period Appropriate for Use in Private lOb-
5 Actions?, 47 WASH. & La L. REv. 541, 575-85 (1990); Bloomenthal, The Statute of
Limitations and Rule l0b-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 235
(1989); Garrett, The Ramshackle Edifice: Limitations Periods for Private Actions Under Rule
lOb-5, 28 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1989).
130. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman, and Ashmore, 788 F.2d
1500, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986); Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876-
77 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1985); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d
1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982).
131. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (stating that "[ilt shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce . . . .") (emphasis added); id. at § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (stating need
for regulation of interstate securities transactions).
132. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 159-65 (discussing citizenship of various
parties in Lampf, Pleva).
133. See A. JACOBS, LrriATION & PRACTCE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 235.02, at 10-21 to 10-
30 (2d ed. 1988); American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
supra note 75, at 659-66.
134. See A. JACOBS, supra note 133, at § 235.02, at 10-21 to 10-30. Although the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had not addressed the issue, the district courts borrowing
Tennesee limitations periods before Lampf, Pleva were split on whether a ten year catch-all
statute of limitations, a three year statute applicable to fraud, or the two year Blue Sky statute
of limitations applied to a § 10(b) claim. See Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-21 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (describing development of case law on
subject); Media General, Inc. v. Tanner, 625 F. Supp. 237, 245-47 (W.D. Tenn. !985) (same).
135. See supra note 129 (citing authorities).
136. See, e.g., supra note 129 (citing authorities); L. Loss, F m ENTALs OF SEcURTIEs
REGULATION 992-1003 (2d ed. 1988); 2 T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.8,
at 128 n.6 (practitioner's ed., 2d ed. 1990) (collecting commentary); American Bar Association
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, supra note 75, at 646-47, 656-57; see also
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.)
("With a unanimity unmatched in any other corner of securities law, everyone wants a simpler
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were offered in support of that view, including that Congress intended for
national regulation, that ready limitations periods are available in the federal
securities laws, that the confused state of the law wasted judicial resources
and was unfair to litigants, and that the borrowing of state law encouraged
forum shopping. 137 As Professor Loss put it, "[wiould it not be eminently
more consistent with the overall statutory scheme to look to what Congress
itself did when it was thinking specifically of private actions in securities
cases than to a grab-bag of more or less analogous state statutes?"' 3 8
Once it is decided to look to other than state law, there are many federal
limitations periods from which to choose. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 sets forth express limitations periods for actions brought under Section
9139 (prohibiting manipulation of securities prices) and Section 1814 (prohib-
iting the filing of misleading documents with the Securities & Exchange
Commission). For both, Congress created limitations periods that vary
somewhat in specific language but generally limit the filing of suit to one
year from actual or constructive discovery, or at the most three years from
the date of the alleged misconduct.' 4' The Securities Act of 1933, which, inter
alia, prohibits omissions and misrepresentations in registration statements,
42
way-and to everyone that means a uniform federal statute of limitations."), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
137. See Guin & Donaldson, supra note 129, at 542; Bloomenthal, supra note 129, at
271-72; Garrett, supra note 129, at 18-24. Besides the fact that numerous actors from many
states often are involved in significant securities transactions, forum shopping is a distinct
possibility in light of the broad venue and service provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
138. L. Loss, supra note 136, at 995.
139. See Securities Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988). Section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. §
78i(e), provides that "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section, unless brought within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation
and within three years after such violation." Section 9, which generally prohibits deception or
manipulation of securities prices, includes a number of elements making it difficult for plaintiffs
to establish a violation of the section and, therefore, is rarely used. See L. Loss, supra note
136, at 919-21; see also infra note 219 (stating Justice Kennedy's questioning in Lampf, Pleva
of Court's application of § 9(e) limitations language to § 10(b) claims).
140. See Securities Exchange Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988). Section 18(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(c), provides that "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this
section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause
of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued." Section 18 generally
imposes liability on any person who makes, or causes to be made, any material misrepresen-
tation or omission in a document filed with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act
or rule thereunder. See L. Loss, supra note 136, at 922-23. Because of various prerequisites
to liability, it is difficult to establish a violation of that section. See id.
141. In addition, § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b), which
allows for rescission of certain contracts that violate the Act, has a similar one/three year
limitations scheme, which was added by amendment in 1938. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch.
677, § 3, 52 Stat. 1076.
142. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988), allows purchasers
to bring suit against persons involved in the issuance of a registration statement containing a
material misrepresentation or omission of a material fact. See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities
Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Landis, The
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also includes a similar, though not identical, one/three year limitations
scheme.
3
However, there is some variation in the limitations periods found in the
federal securities laws. Actions brought under the short-swing profit provision
of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act restricting trading of securities by corporate
insiders are subject to a maximum two-year limitations period. 44 A longer
alternative is the five year statute of limitations provided in the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which amended the
Securities Exchange Act to expressly prohibit insider trading, a potent form
of securities fraud.Y5 Thus, the 1934 Act, as amended, includes at least three
different limitations periods ranging from one to five years.
Relying on DelCostello and Agency Holding, some courts of appeals
beginning in 1988 started to borrow a federal limitations period applicable to
some claims expressly created by the Securities Exchange Act.' 6 Other circuits,
however, refused to do so.147 Until the Supreme Court's recent edict on the
Legislative History of the Securities Acts of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 29 (1959); Douglas
& Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933).
143. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988), provides in pertinent part that
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created ... unless brought
within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence ....
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created ... more
than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or ... more
than three years after the sale.
Id. Section 13's one/three year limitations period applies to claims under § 11, supra note
142, and § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988), which provides a remedy for a
purchaser of securities damaged by false statements made by the seller.
144. See Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Section 16(b), which
requires the disgorgement of unlawful profits from trading in securities by corporate insiders,
sets a two year period of repose. It specifically provides that "no ... suit [to enforce its
provisions] shall be brought more than two years after the date [the] profit [in dispute] was
realized." See id. Congress may have selected this shorter limitations period because violation
of § 16(b) is a strict liability offense. See generally L. Loss, supra note 136, at 541-82.
145. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5(b)(4), 102 Stat. 4680, 4681, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4)
(1988) (stating that "[n]o action may be brought under this section more than 5 years after
the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the violation"). Similarly, the limitations
period for securities fraud under the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code requires
suit within one year of discovery and a maximum of five years from the fraud. See AMERincA
LAw IN sTrtUE, FEDERAL SEcUrrMEs CODE § 1727(b), § 1727 comment 1 (1988). The commen-
tary suggests that the one/three year scheme found in the Securities Exchange Act is too short.
See id.
146. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387-90 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.
2887 (1991); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1542-51 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988); see also Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331-33 (7th Cir.)
(questioning practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations for § 10(b) claims before Agency
Holding), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
147. See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.
1990) (per curiam); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1990); Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218
(6th Cir. 1989).
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question, In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation was the leading
decision borrowing a federal statute of limitations. 14 In that case, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit sitting en banc held that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provided a closer analogy than any state statute, and
that federal policy and the practicalities of Section 10(b) litigation favored
application of limitations periods from the Act. 49 Borrowing the most prev-
alent limitations period in the Securities Exchange Act, the court held that
Section 10(b) claims were time-barred unless brought within one year after
the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the facts constituting the
violation, and in no event more than three years after the violation. 150
Data Access was received favorably in some quarters' 1 and was followed
by two circuits.'5 2 The commentary remained unanimous on one point-that
the courts should select a limitations period for Section 10(b) claims from
the federal securities laws, not state law. 53 However, the commentators
differed on which limitations period was the most appropriate. Some argued
that Congress, if it had considered the question, would have intended a one/
three year statute of limitations to apply to Section 10(b) claims.'A Others
suggested the need for the longer five year statute of limitations added to
the 1934 Act by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act.
55
The proposals focused primarily on the question of which, as a policy matter,
was the best limitations period. None analyzed in detail the difficult questions
concerning whether the judiciary was compelled by constitutional or statutory
dictate to apply a state limitations period, or whether the courts could
independently fashion a statute of limitations tailored for Section 10(b) even
148. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). Judge Aldisert,
who wrote the en banc opinion, expressed similar views earlier in a separate opinion in Davis
v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (Aldisert, J.,
sitting by designation, concurring).
149. See In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1545 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
150. See id. at 1550.
151. See, e.g., Note, The Proper Statute of Limitations on a Rule lOb-5 Action, 23 IND.
L. REv. 731 (1990); Note, Statutes of Limitation for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: A New
Proposal for Uniformity, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 665 (1989). But see Guin & Donaldson,
supra note 129, at 563-75 (criticizing Data Access).
152. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville
Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). A conflict
had existed about whether the federal limitations period adopted in Data Access and its progeny
should be applied retroactively. Compare Hill v. Equitable Trust, 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988)
(applying Data Access retroactively), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989), with Levine v. NL
Indus., 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991) (declining to apply new rule retroactively) and Welch v.
Cadre, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), vacated and remanded in light of James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991), and Lampf, Pleva, Prupis, & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991). See also infra note 216 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
objection to retroactive application of Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
154. See Bloomenthal, supra note 129, at 257-62.
155. See Guin & Donaldson, supra note 129, at 575-85.
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if some limitations period for another type of claim could be located in some
other state or federal statute. Frustrated by years of avoidance of, or at least
inattention to, the question, the commentators challenged the Supreme Court
to resolve it.156
3. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
Last Term, the Court squarely decided the question of the proper
limitations period to apply to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. In Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertsony17 the Court, in a five-four
decision, rejected the borrowing of state statutes of limitations for Section
10(b) claims. Presented with numerous federal options, including several from
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court selected the one year from
actual or constructive discovery, with a maximum of three years from the
alleged misconduct, 58 found in certain provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act as well as the Securities Act of 1933. The five opinions constitute a
microcosm of the recurring debate about federalism, separation of powers
and jurisprudential questions with respect to federal common lawmaking.
The dispute in Lampf, Pleva arose from the sale of Connecticut limited
partnerships formed to purchase and lease computer hardware and software.159
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow, a New Jersey law firm, provided
legal services and rendered an opinion on the tax consequences of investing
in the partnerships. 16 Investors purchased units in the partnerships from 1979
to 1981 .161 The partnerships failed. By early 1983, plaintiffs received notice
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of an investigation. 62 The IRS
disallowed the tax benefits in 1985.163
In November 1986 and June 1987 in the federal district court for the
District of Oregon, John Gilbertson and other plaintiffs, residents of Oregon,
California and Washington,' 4 sued Lampf, Pleva and a number of other
defendants from a variety of different states involved in the preparation of
the offering memoranda for the partnerships. 65 Plaintiffs allegedly first
156. See Bloomenthal, supra note 129, at 296-97; Garrett, supra note 129, at 34-40.
157. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45 (outlining various limitations periods in
Securities Exchange Act and Securities Act).





163. Id. at 2776-77.
164. Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbert-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333).
165. See 111 S. Ct. at 2776. The other defendants were New York and New Jersey parties
who sold equipment to the partnerships, New York and Texas equipment appraisers identified
in the offering memoranda, New York and New Jersey residents who appraised the software,
equipment lessees from Delaware, Illinois, New York and North Carolina, and software
marketing companies from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See Brief for Petitioner,
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333).
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became aware of misrepresentations made by the defendants in 1985 when
the IRS disallowed the tax benefits.' l
Following the well-established Ninth Circuit practice of "borrowing"
analogous state statutes of limitations, 167 the district court applied Oregon's
two-year statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims to the Section 10(b)
claims. 16 Finding that the declining financial condition of the partnerships
placed the plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the fraud as early as October 1982,169
the district court ruled that the claims were time barred and granted summary
judgment for defendants. 70 Although agreeing that Oregon law supplied the
proper limitations period, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.'7' The court held that disputed factual issues about when plaintiffs
should have discovered the alleged fraud precluded summary judgment.'7
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court reversed. In a
part of the opinion joined by only a plurality of the Court, Justice Blackmun
reviewed the Court's previous decisions in this murky area.' 73 At the outset,
Justice Blackmun emphasized that the "usual rule" is to borrow the state
limitations period for the cause of action most analogous to the federal claim;
that "practice, derived from the Rules of Decision Act ... has enjoyed
sufficient longevity that we may assume that ... Congress ordinarily 'intends
by its silence that we borrow state law.""' '74 The plurality acknowledged the
equally well-established exception to the "usual rule" that, because Congress
could not have intended to select a state rule at odds with federal law, the
courts should not blindly borrow a state limitations period that would frustrate
federal policies. 75 Emphasizing that the borrowing doctrine may not be
"lightly abandoned" and that the analysis is a "delicate one," Justice
Blackmun offered a "hierarchical inquiry" for selecting a limitations period
for a federal claim lacking one.
76
The three-part hierarchy attempts to distill, if not reconcile, the Court's
recent decisions on borrowing limitations periods. The first inquiry is whether
there is a need for a uniform statute of limitations. Acknowledging that one
166. See 111 S. Ct. at 2777.
167. See, e.g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1980).
168. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.110(1) (1989).
169. 111 S. Ct. at 2777.
170. Id.
171. See Reitz v. Leasing Consultants Associates, 895 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1990) (memo-
randum disposition) (reporting reversal of district court decision).
172. Lampf, Pleva, 111 S. Ct. at 2777.
173. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's
opinion in its entirety. Justice Scalia also joined the opinion, except for Part IIA. Id. at 2783
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). Part IIA is Justice Blackmun's
restatement of the law in the area. See infra text accompanying notes 174-80.
174. 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley Duff & Associates,
483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)).
175. See 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (citing DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Agency
Holding Corp., supra; McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958)).
176. See 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
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class of state statutes of limitations sometimes might provide the necessary
uniformity, Justice Blackmun attempted to reconcile the approaches of Wilson
v. Garcia in which the Court adopted one type of state statute in each of
the states and Agency Holding in which the Court borrowed the limitations
period from another federal statute.'7 If uniformity is deemed necessary, the
next inquiry is whether the source of the uniform limitations period should
be state or federal law.17 8 As in Agency Holding, Justice Blackmun reiterated
that the multistate character of a federal claim militates in favor of a uniform
federal statute of limitations. 179 Finally, because of "the presumption of state
borrowing," the court must ascertain "that an analogous federal source truly
affords a 'closer fit' with the cause of action at issue than does any available
state-law source."' 80
The remainder of Justice Blackmun's opinion represented the views of a
majority of the Court. Observing that it had "repeatedly recognized" the
implied private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,18' the
Court understood that it was "faced with the awkward task of discerning
the limitations period that Congress intended courts to apply to a cause of
action it really never knew existed.' 8 2 To accomplish that difficult task, the
Court established a new rule for selecting statutes of limitations for causes
of action implied into federal statutes:
[W]here ... the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that
also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation,
a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the
proper limitations period. We can imagine no clearer indication of
how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations implicit
in any limitations provision than the balance struck by the same
Congress in limiting similar and related protections .... When the
statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions,
the inquiry usually should be at an end. Only where no analogous
counterpart is available should a court then proceed to apply state-
borrowing principles.'83
The Court therefore rejected the state law presumption when the right
of action is implied in a statute that includes a limitations period for express
actions. This represents a significant departure from the Court's past pron-
177. See id. at 2779; supra text accompanying notes 99-103, 107-19 (discussing Wilson v.
Garcia and Agency Holding).
178. See I11 S. Ct. at 2779.
179. See id.
180. Id. (emphasis added). In that regard, Justice Blackmun wrote that "commonality of
purpose" and the "similarity of elements" between competing state and federal statutes are
relevant. Id.
181. Id. at 2779-80 (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 121-29 (dis-
cussing implied right of action under Section 10(b)).
182. 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
183. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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ouncements on the question and ultimately may erode to some degree the
state law borrowing doctrine. Frequently, it would seem, a comprehensive
statute includes a limitations period for some express claim "comparable" to
the implied right in question. In those instances, Lampf, Pleva ordinarily
would seem to require application of that limitations period, not that of any
state.
Applying the new test, the Court looked to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which contains several express causes of action with explicit limita-
tions periods, and did not consider state law alternatives.' 84 The Court selected
a variation of the one year from discovery with a three year "period of
repose" found in the 1934 Act and the Securities Act of 1933.185 The Court
concluded that Section 9 of the 1934 Act,' 86 barring willful manipulation of
security prices, and Section 18,187 prohibiting misleading filings, "target the
precise dangers that are the focus of § 10(b)" and "facilitate a central goal:
'to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices . . . . 111 Because
the various one-and-three year periods differ in terminology, 89 the Court
sought to avoid any uncertainty and without explanation decreed that the
specific limitations language of Section 9(e) would apply to all future Section
10(b) claims.' 9°
The Court had before it many alternative federal and state limitations
periods. The Court summarily rejected the shorter two year limitations period
for claims brought under Section 16(b).' 9' It also found unpersuasive the
SEC's argument for adoption of the five year period set forth in the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act's amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act. 92 The Court emphasized that the recently enacted law focuses
exclusively on insider trading' 93 and that there was no suggestion that Congress
intended "the enhanced protection" of a five year limitations period to apply
to other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.194 The Court reached that
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 139, 140, & 143 (quoting Securities Exchange Act §§ 9(e) and 18(c)
and Securities Act § 13).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
188. 111 S. Ct. at 2781 (citations omitted).
189. See supra notes 139, 140, & 143 (quoting provisions).
190. See 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9. The Court failed to mention, much less explain, its two
previous suggestions that state law supplied the proper limitations period for § 10(b) claims.
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 n.18 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
191. See supra note 144 (quoting § 16(b)). The Court concluded that § 16(b) "differs in
focus from § 10(b)" and therefore is not "an appropriate source from which to borrow a
limitations period .... " 111 S. Ct. at 2780 n.5.
192. 111 S. Ct. at 2781.
193. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-
l(a) (1988) (defining insider trading as "purchasing or selling a security while in possession of
material, nonpublic information").
194. 111 S. Ct. at 2781. To the contrary, the Court read the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d),
as suggesting the opposite conclusion. See 111 S. Ct. at 2781. That section provides that
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conclusion even though Section 10(b) previously had been interpreted to
prohibit insider trading.' 9
The Court rejected out of hand a new catch-all four year statute of
limitations passed by Congress in 1990 to apply to future federal legislation
lacking limitations periods. '9 The Court failed to address plaintiffs' contention
that the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,'9 which includes language
nearly identical to Rule lOb-5, offered a more appropriate limitations period
of three years from discovery.198 Finally, the Court declined Justice Kennedy's
invitation to borrow the one year from discovery but not the three year
statute of repose from the Securities Exchange Act.'9 Characterizing the one-
three year scheme as Congress's "indivisible determination" on the appro-
priate limitations period,m° the Court condemned Justice Kennedy's proposal
as "the type of judicial policymaking that our borrowing doctrine was
intended to avoid."' The Court further reasoned that the three year period
of repose would not frustrate the policies underlying Section 10(b).2
Although recognizing that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations
ordinarily is permitted, the Court held that Congress barred such tolling in
the case of Section 10(b) by enacting the one/three year scheme in the
Securities Exchange Act? °3 Because the plaintiffs sued more than three years
after the alleged misrepresentations, the Supreme Court reversed.?
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to
bring an action to enforce a requirement of this chapter or the availability of any cause of
action implied from a provision of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (emphasis added).
195. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-57 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). Although some § 10(b) cases might be based on insider trading and thus two
limitations periods might apply to different claims based on the same alleged misconduct, the
Court downplayed the significance of that possibility. See I11 S. Ct. at 2781.
196. 111 S. Ct. at 2782-83 n.10; supra note 81 (quoting statute).
197. See Pub. L. No. 90-448 § 1412, 15 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(2) (1988) (as amended by Pub.
L. No. 96-153 § 406, 93 Stat. 1131 (1979)).
198. See Brief for Respondents, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
11 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333).
199. 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.8.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2782.
203. Id. The Court's finding is consistent with the lower court's refusal to permit equitable
tolling under § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act, see, e.g., Admiralty. Fund v. Hugh Johnson
& Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982), and § 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, see,
e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 942 (1983). Some commentators before Lampf, Pleva also concluded that equitable
tolling was inappropriate when borrowing the one/three year limitations scheme for § 10(b)
claims. See Bloomenthal, supra note 129, at 278-87; American Bar Association Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities, supra note 75, at 655; see also Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d
1329, 1332 (7th Cir.) (remarking that "[t]he legislative history ... makes it pellucid that
Congress included statutes of repose [in the 1934 Act] because of fear that lingering liabilities
would disrupt normal business and facilitate false claims. It was understood that the three
year rule was to be absolute"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
204. Lampf, Pleva, 111 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
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Voicing a blend of federalism, separation of powers and jurisprudential
concerns, Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 23
Disagreeing with Justice Blackmun's hierarchy, he reiterated a previously
stated view that, when a federal statute lacks a limitations period, state
periods govern, and "if they are inconsistent with the purposes of the federal
act, no limitations period exists." 2°6 Chiding the Court for implying rights of
action into statutes,207 Justice Scalia stated that such a practice "may be a
proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals." He
suggested that, while the "irrational results" caused by the borrowing of state
statutes of limitations in implied actions might have the beneficial effect of
deterring future "judicial invention" of claims, it would be unfair to those
forced to litigate.209 In an apparent response to Justice Kennedy's dissent,
Justice Scalia suggested that to imply a statute of limitations not expressly
adopted by a legislature is "lawless. ' 210 By applying a limitations period from
another section of the same statute, the majority in his view took the "most
responsible," albeit artificial, course.
21
1
Objecting on federalism and separation of powers grounds, Justice Stevens
dissented.2 1 2 He restated the view that, when a federal statute is silent on the
subject, the Rules of Decision Act requires application of a state limitations
period. 23 Justice Stevens further observed that "the Court has undertaken a
lawmaking task that should properly be performed by Congress. ' '21 4 Although
agreeing that a uniform limitations period is preferable to the chaos caused
by the application of state law, Justice Stevens emphasized that "Congress,
rather than the federal judiciary, has the responsibility for making the policy
205. Id. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
206. Id. at 2783 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143,
157-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)) and Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488
U.S. 319, 334 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see supra note 119 (describing Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Agency Holding).
207. 111 S. Ct. at 2783 (stating that "[t]he present case presents a distinctive difficulty
because it involves one of those so-called 'implied' causes of action that, for several decades,
this Court was prone to discover in-or, more accurately, create in reliance upon-federal
legislation") (citation omitted). In other cases, Justice Scalia also has expressed distaste for
implied private rights of action under the federal securities laws. See Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2767 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment)
(agreeing that, although element supplied by Court to implied claim was "entirely contrary to
the modern law of torts," it was correct because implied rights should be "narrow"); cf.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(suggesting under another type of statute that courts "should get out of the business of implied
rights of action altogether").




212. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined the dissent. See id.
213. Id. at 2784 n.2 (citing, inter alia, his dissent in DelCostello, see supra note 93).
214. Id. at 2783.
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determinations ... and choosing a new limitations period and its associated
tolling rules.
'21 5
Articulating an approach that constitutes the clearest form of judicial
lawmaking, Justice Kennedy dissented. 2 6 He agreed with the majority on the
need for a uniform federal statute of limitations but disagreed with the
adoption of the three year statute of repose. 2 7 That part of the statute of
limitations, to Justice Kennedy, is simply bad policy:
This absolute time-bar on private § 10(b) suits conflicts with tradi-
tional limitations periods for fraud-based actions, frustrates the use-
fulness of § 10(b) in protecting defrauded investors, and imposes
severe practical limitations on a federal implied cause of action that
has become an essential component of the protection the law gives
to investors who have been injured by unlawful practices.
28
Noting the Court's failure to identify reasons for arbitrarily borrowing
the specific limitations language of Section 9(e), Justice Kennedy suggested
that the Court had the competence to fashion one slightly different from any
other found in the Securities Exchange Act.21 9 His justification was that other
actions under those laws lacked Section 10(b)'s "scope and coverage." M
Fearing that victims of securities fraud may be unable to bear the heavy
burden of discovering the fraud in time to bring suit, 2 Justice Kennedy
bluntly stressed that the three year statute of repose "makes a § 10(b) action
all but a dead letter for injured investors. ' ' m
The divisive debate among the five-four Court in Lampf, Pleva mirrors
the tensions in the Supreme Court's federal common law jurisprudence. As
215. Id. at 2784 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens pointed out that, by adding a four
year limitations period to the Clayton Act in 1955, Congress, not the federal courts, in the
past created uniformity that it concluded was necessary. Id. at 2784 n.3 (citing 69 Stat. 283,
15 U.S.C. § 15b).
216. 111 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined Justice
Kennedy's dissent. She also wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, objecting to
the retroactive application of the new limitations period to this case on the ground that it was
contrary to precedent. See id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In a case decided the same
day as Lampf, Pleva, a sharply divided Court, with no one opinion representing a majority,
retroactively applied a previous decision invalidating a state statute on constitutional grounds.
See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). Since Lampf, Pleva and
James B. Beam, the lower courts have tended to apply the new Section 10(b) limitations rule
retroactively. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,194, at 91,024 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 1991) (per curiam).
217. 111 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2788-89. Justice Kennedy suggested that it is odd to utilize the limitations
period for the "rarely used remedy" of § 9 of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 2789; see
also L. Loss, supra note 136, at 920 (referring to § 9(e) as "a dead letter"); supra note 139
(noting difficulties of establishing § 9 violation).
220. 111 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (remarking that "[t]he most extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered
within the time allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 Act").
222. Id. at 2790.
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in DelCostello and Agency Holding, the majority opts for a federal approach
to the question and purports to discern Congressional intent, thus alleviating
to some degree separation of powers concerns. National prevail over state
interests in the, federalism calculus. Though ostensibly paying deference to
federalism concerns by labelling the borrowing of state law as a "presump-
tion," the Court rejects state law, selects a federal statute of limitations, and
endorses a test that in many circumstances may avoid the need to consider
state law at all. Finally, as jurisprudential concerns might suggest, the Court
discarded the "judicial policymaking" proposed by Justice Kennedy.
By giving short-shrift to the many other limitations periods in the federal
securities laws, the Court made its own policy judgments about the proper
statute of limitations applicable to Section 10(b) claims. The process by which
the Court ultimately selected a limitations period is instructive in that regard.
By selecting one of a myriad of possible limitations periods, including a
number of different ones from the same statute on which the claim was
based, the Court weighed "federal policy" and the "practicalities of litiga-
tion" under Section 10(b). The Court therefore necessarily made a policy
choice in choosing the one/three year statute.
Although rejecting the fashioning of a unique limitations period as
"lawless," Justice Scalia accepts a federal solution to the problem. Justice
Stevens, besides believing that the Rules of Decision Act compels application
of state law, staunchly advocates the separation of powers principle that
Congress should be making the arbitrary judgments inherent in the creation
of a statute of limitations. In an approach starkly different from that
articulated by any other Justice, Justice Kennedy proposes the tailoring of a
unique limitations period representing a refined version of a limitations period
found in the Securities Exchange Act to reflect the practicalities of securities
fraud litigation.
In the end, a difficult question is whether the majority's policy choice is
reasonable. Besides the need for certainty and avoidance of judicial waste,m
the national scope of regulation and the interstate nature of securities trans-
actions-which, as Lampf, Pleva illustrates, may include actors (corporations,
officers and directors, investment bankers, accounting and law firms, and
purchasers and sellers of securities) in many states-suggests that a uniform
national limitations period, as adopted for similar reasons in Agency Holding,
is preferable. 4 There is a particular need for unifoimity in Section 10(b)
class actions premised on the fraud-on-the-market theory. 5 In the typical
223. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78 (discussing need to imply limitations period
in statute lacking one).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 107-19 (discussing Agency Holding).
225. The Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988), approved
the fraud-on-the-market theory in § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. That
theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market,
the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information
regarding the company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
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fraud-on-the-market action involving a publicly traded company, a purchaser
or seller of a security (and potential Section 10(b) class representative)-
frequently exists in every state of the Union. Consequently, if the courts
resort to state law, the limitations periods of 50 different states might apply
to identical conduct?227 The borrowing doctrine took root in an era of simpler
litigation in cases in which a single plaintiff and a single defendant per lawsuit
was the norm. 8 Its application is problematic in cases with hundreds, if not
thousands, of class members and numerous defendants located throughout
the countryn 9 Under those circumstances, borrowing state law in effect
sanctions forum shopping and allows plaintiffs to avoid suit in states with
limitations periods that have expired and to file in states in which they have
not. 0
misstatements .... The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the
plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of
direct reliance on misrepresentations.
Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. at 241-42). Though accepting the theory generally, the Court emphasized that the
presumption of reliance is rebuttable by evidence "that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to
trade at a fair market price." Id. at 248. For recent commentary on Basic Inc. v. Levinson
and the fraud-on-the-market theory, see Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations
Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991); Macey & Miller, The Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. Rv. 1001 (1991); Macey, Miller, Mitchell & Netter, Lessons
From Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v.
Levinson, 77 VA. L. Rxv. 1017 (1991); Macey & Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1990).
226. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
227. See L. Loss, supra note 136, at 994 (observing that, because of diversity in state
analogies selected by courts and number of jurisdictions, at least 500 possible limitations
periods might apply).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81 (citing cases utilizing borrowing doctrine).
229. See, e.g., Pinney v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 735 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(discussing five options available to court attempting to determine applicable limitations period);
Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1457-58 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (following
traditional rule and borrowing 26 state statutes of limitation); In re National Student Marketing
Litig., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 97,926, at 90,709 (D.D.C. 1981)
(noting possible application of 34 different state statutes of limitations); In re Clinton Oil Co.
Sec. Litig., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015, at 91,557, 91,566-
91,573 (D. Kan. 1977) (borrowing limitations periods from eight different states and eight
different statutes of limitations to same misconduct).
230. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 154; Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations
Provisions, 53 CoLuM. L. Rav. 68, 77 (1953) (discussing federal statutes lacking limitations
periods and emphasizing that "forum shopping is clearly undesirable, because it disserves the
dominant policy in this area-uniformity throughout the federal system").
Although one might think that conflicts of laws principles might prevent forum shopping,
conflicts has long been in disarray when it comes to discerning the statute of limitations
applicable to a claim touching on more than one state. See Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in
the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 287 (1960). Conflicts
principles failed to prevent forum shopping in § 10(b) cases when the lower courts employed
the state borrowing doctrine. See Bloomenthal, supra note 129, at 275-78; Guin & Donaldson,
supra note 129, at 542 n.5; see, e.g., Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324, 1333-
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If a uniform national limitations period is deemed necessary, the next
question is whether the one/three year statute was the appropriate one. It
obviously is next to impossible to divine the intent of Congress concerning
the proper statute of limitations for a claim that it never expressly created.
It therefore is problematic to claim, as the Court did in Lampf, Pleva, that
Congress intended the one/three year statute to apply to implied private rights
of action under Section 10(b). 231 At least if given the opportunity to consider
the question today, Congress might be persuaded, as it was in two other
recent instances, 2 2 to provide a longer statute of limitations for a fraud-based
claim such as Section 10(b).
Similarly, the Court for good reason generally has recognized equitable
tolling of limitations periods, particularly if a person stands to benefit from
effective concealment of a fraudulent scheme.2 3 Because a carefully designed
securities fraud scheme may be difficult to detect, an absolute three year bar,
as Justice Kennedy contended, may indeed be too short for defrauded investors
to uncover the fraud.? By premising its adherence to the three year maximum
39 (D. Del. 1983) (analyzing complex conflicts questions raised in § 10(b) action involving
parties from several states), rev'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1008 (1989). Indeed, the conflicts rules in an ordinary tort case may lend themselves
to forum shopping. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (positing that "[tihe new, flexible standards, such as 'interest analysis,'
have caused pervasive uncertainty, higher cost of litigation, more forum shopping . . ., and
an uncritical drift in favor of plaintiffs") (citations omitted). I owe this conflicts of law point
to my colleague Friedrich K. Juenger.
231. See Lampf, Pleva, 111 S. Ct. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment) (admitting that Court was "imagining" what Congress would have done if it
addressed limitations question and if it had provided for express right of action under § 10(b)).
232. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-la to 78t-le (1988); Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 590 (1968), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1988) (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-153, 93 Stat. 1131 (1979)).
233. See, e.g., Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 111 S. Ct. 453, 457-58 (1990); Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 309 (1989); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342,
348 (1874); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (stating in dictum that
equitable tolling doctrine "is read into every federal statute of limitation") (emphasis added).
Lower courts borrowing state statutes of limitation before Lampf, Pleva generally applied
federal equitable tolling principles in the event of fraud or deception. See, e.g., Suslick v.
Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984); Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
234. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189 (1976) (describing elaborate
fraud scheme extending in time from 1942 through 1966, with most of fraudulent transactions
in 1950s, which did not come to light until 1968 when perpetrator of fraud described scheme
in suicide note); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,128, at 90,713 (10th Cir. July 22, 1991) (finding after Lampf, Pleva that
one-three year limitations scheme barred § 10(b) action in which alleged multi-million dollar
Ponzi scheme extending from 1964 until 1972 injured thousands of investors); see also Guin
& Donaldson, supra note 129, at 568-71 (discussing difficulties in discovering Ponzi schemes
or fraud in municipal bond offerings within three years of fraud); Akst, How Minkow Fooled
the Auditors, FoRBEs, Oct. 2, 1989, at 126 (describing elaborate fraud by Barry Minkow of
ZZZZ Best extending over number of years).
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on a weak theory of deference to a legislative judgment, the Court avoided
discussing, much less justifying, the impact of the three year cap on Section
10(b) private enforcement actions.
Nor is Justice Kennedy's proposal all that different in terms of judicial
lawmaking from the technique employed by the Court in borrowing limitations
periods. Even under traditional borrowing principles, courts enjoy much
discretion in determining the state claim most analogous to the federal one
and thus which state limitations period apply.235 There also is considerable
leeway when determining whether federal policy and the practicalities of
litigation required departure from state borrowing and application of a
limitations period from an analogous federal statute. 236 There clearly was
significant room for maneuvering when the Court in Lampf, Pleva arbitrarily
selected one out of several limitations periods from the Securities Exchange
Act. In short, the courts always have enjoyed great discretion in the ultimate
selection of the appropriate limitations period for a deficient federal statute.
It is not a significant departure from settled doctrine to suggest that the
judiciary, as Justice Kennedy proposed, should formulate the limitations
period that is best tailored to the federal claim in question. As the equitable
doctrine of laches illustrates, 2 7 that tack would not be unprecedented. In that
light, the Court in Lampf, Pleva at least should have considered more seriously
the benefits of fashioning a unique limitations period specifically designed
for the practicalities of Section 10(b) litigation.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 86-120, 133-34. Cf. Chaueffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (noting that Court could not decide
whether union's breach of duty of fair representation of member was legal or equitable in
nature by looking to analogous claims for purposes of determining right to jury trial under
Seventh Amendment).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 86-120.
237. See Harwood v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. 78, 81 (1872) (stating that "[w]ithout reference
to any statute of limitations, the courts have adopted the principle that the delay which will
defeat a recovery must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case"); see, e.g.,
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946); Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 317-
18 (1904); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1940). See generally 2 J. STORY, CoausN-
TARms ON EQurTY JURiSPRUDENCE 842-53 (M. Bigelow 13th ed. 1886). In International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 713 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), Justice White suggested such an approach in dissenting
from the Court's adoption of state statutes of limitation for a federal labor statute:
The case for the Court's decision thus ultimately comes down to the proposition
that fashioning a uniform federal statute would involve too bald an exercise of
judicial innovation. This is an argument I have difficulty in fathoming. Courts have
not always been reluctant to "create" statutes of limitations, the common-law
doctrine of prescription by which judgments are presumed to have been paid after
the lapse of 20 years, . . . being just one example. In equity they have applied the
doctrine of laches .... But here there is no dispute concerning whether a statute
of limitations is to be fashioned-the choice is between one statute or 50.
Id. (citations omitted); see Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Comment, A Functional
Approach to Borrowing Limitations Periods for Federal Statutes, 77 CAtn. L. REv. 133, 159-
69 (1989).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48:879
This discussion should not be understood to suggest that the Court's
rejection of the state borrowing doctrine when the federal statute includes a
limitations period for an express right of action, is entirely in error. That
new rule represents movement in the right direction. The same federal statute
is more likely to approximate the policies implicated by a claim implied into
that same statute than those addressed by some other state or federal statute
passed at a different time to address different concerns. Nonetheless, for the
reasons outlined here, the Court could have done better.
B. The Demand Requirement in Shareholder Derivative Suits Brought
Under the Federal Securities Laws
Corporations, of course, are organized under the laws of the various
states.2 8 Still, as the federal securities laws attest, Congress, particularly in
the aftermath of the crash of 1929, has regulated corporate activity in a
variety of ways. 219 Those laws are riddled with questions that the statutory
language fails to answer, questions that have increased greatly because of
rights of action implied into those statutes.
Based on such extensive regulation, Judge Friendly suggested the possi-
bility of a federal common law of corporations.? The development of such
law, however, has not come to fruition. To the contrary, even when simply
filling the interstices of federal securities laws concerning matters implicating
the allocation of authority within a corporation, the Supreme Court generally
has found compelling reasons to resort to state law.
1. Burks v. Lasker
The 1979 case of Burks v. Lasker21 is a significant example of the Court's
incorporation of state law when application of the federal securities laws
implicates issues of internal corporate authority. In Burks, the investment
company's disinterested directors concluded that litigation was not in the best
interests of the corporation and sought to dismiss a shareholder derivative
suit against some of the company's directors and the investment adviser
238. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF COPORATONS § 1, at 7 (3d ed. 1983)
(observing that "[t]he American laws of business enterprises, in the sense of the legal principles
controlling the formation and ordinary operations of most business enterprises, have tradi-
tionally been almost entirely state laws .. ."). This need not have been the case. James
Madison unsuccessfully proposed a constitutional provision that would have given the federal
government the power "to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might
require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent." J. MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 638 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966).
239. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 238, §§ 291-317, at 784-867.
240. See Friendly, supra note 33, at 413. Some commentators have advocated that Congress
should act to establish minimum corporate law standards. See, e.g., Seligman, The Case for
Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REv. 947, 971-74 (1990); Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696-705 (1974).
241. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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brought under the Investment Company Act242 and the Investment Advisers
Act. 243 Because the claims were implied rights of action, the statutes were
silent on the rules governing derivative actions brought to enforce their
provisions.244 In deference to the business judgment of the disinterested
directors, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
245
Concluding that the disinterested directors could not foreclose a derivative
suit to enforce federal law, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.?
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that state law governed whether
disinterested directors of an investment company could terminate a derivative
suit brought against other directors under the federal securities statutes in
question. Although finding the Erie doctrine inapplicable to the enforcement
of a federal statute, the Court in Burks still concluded that state, not federal,
law filled the statutory gap. 247 The Court made the standard acknowledgement
that, when inconsistent with federal policy, state law cannot be applied s
The Court, however, emphasized that Congress has not authorized the judicial
creation of a federal common law of corporations. 249 Nor did Congress
suggest an intent to displace state law regulating the power of corporate
directors in derivative actions brought under the two federal securities statutes
in question.20 The Court held that, so long as consistent with federal law-
without suggesting when that might be the case, state law governed the
authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits brought to
enforce the federal securities laws. 251 It praised the compulsory incorporation
242. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988). The Investment Company Act sought to remedy
the potential conflict of interest between mutual funds and the fund's investment advisers by,
among other things, requiring that at least 40% of the directors of an investment company
not be affiliated with the adviser. See Investment Company Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
15(c); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4897, 4901. See generally 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 136, §§ 17.1-17.10, at 300-68; T.
FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MoNEY MANAGERs: THE INVESTmENT CoMPANY ACT AND THE
IvsETNr ADvisERs ACT (1978).
243. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988). The Investment Advisers Act generally
regulates non-broker dealers in the business of rendering investment advice. See 2 T. HAZEN,
supra note 136, §§ 18.1-18.4, at 369-86; T. FRANKEL, supra note 242. In essence, "Congress
intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment
advisers." Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977).
244. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding that an implied right of action existed
under the statutes. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1979).
245. See Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
246. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978). The Second Circuit found
that "[it is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will
view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an
adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals
concerned." Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 254-56 (discussing
criticism of Supreme Court decision in Burks).
247. Burks, 441 U.S. at 476-77.
248. Id. at 479.
249. Id. at 477.
250. Id. at 479 & n.6.
251. Id. at 486.
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of state law for "reliev[ing] federal courts of the necessity to fashion an
entire body of federal corporate law out of whole cloth. ' ' 252 The Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of state law.23
As is true for federal common law generally, the Court in Burks appeared
influenced by federalism, separation of powers, and jurisprudential concerns.
In opting for state law, Burks, however, failed to consider whether state law
in the long run would ensure effective enforcement of the Investment Com-
pany Act and the Investment Advisers Act. Indeed, the Court's suggestion
that a so-called disinterested board, if permitted by state law, might silence
a derivative suit brought to enforce a federal securities statute in some
circumstances might undermine shareholders' ability to enforce the will of
Congress.254 Reminiscent of the previously discussed defects of Lampf, Pleva25-
and foreshadowing those of Kamen, the Court would have done better to
consider that possibility. After Burks, lower courts followed its broad language
and rarely found that federal policies precluded termination of a derivative
suit under state law.256
2. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.
Last Term, the Court re-visited questions similar to those addressed in
Burks v. Lasker in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.257 The facts are
252. Id. at 480.
253. Id. at 486. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, concurred in the judgment and
emphasized the absolute proposition, with little explanation but presumably based on federalism
principles embodied in the Rules of Decision Act, that state law must apply. Id. at 487
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
254. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 CoLum. L. RaV. 261 (1981). But see Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 ST. L. REV. 497, 597
(1991) (stating that "[s]ome evidence seems to show that derivative actions tend to be resolved
for structural or cosmetic changes with no tangible economic benefit to the corporation, plus
large attorneys' fees") (footnote omitted); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and
the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CoRaEu. L.
Rav. 261, 277-83 (1986) (stating conclusion of empirical study that shareholder derivative suits
did not benefit corporations). Besides criticizing the holding of Burks v. Lasker on policy
grounds, Professors Coffee and Schwartz also fault the Court for failing to suggest precisely
when state law will frustrate federal policy. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra, at 287-300.
For commentary suggesting that "disinterested" directors may not be truly impartial, see
Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoa. 83 (1985); Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HAgv. L. REV. 597, 611-16 (1982); Dent,
The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative
Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. Rav. 96, 121-22 (1980); Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to
Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1894 (1983).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 157-237.
256. See Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 545, 580-81
(1984); see, e.g., RCM Securities Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1325-30 (2d Cir.
1991); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
257. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991). After Burks v. Lasker, in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,
464 U.S. 523 (1984), the Court avoided a question similar to the one later posed in Kamen
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not extraordinary. Jill Kamen brought a shareholder derivative action on
behalf of Cash Equivalent Fund, Inc., a registered investment company
managing a money market mutual fund, under Section 20(a) of the Investment
Company Act (ICA)2s against Kemper Financial Services, Inc. (KFS), the
Fund's investment adviser. 9 Although Section 20(a) fails to expressly create
a private right of action, the lower courts have implied one.3
°
Kamen averred that, by causing the Fund to issue a proxy statement that
materially misrepresented the fees of the investment adviser, KFS improperly
obtained shareholder approval of the investment adviser contract.21 Claiming
that under the circumstances the making of a demand on the board of
directors to bring suit would be futile and that demand therefore should be
excused, she did not make one.22 To support the futility claim, Kamen alleged
that the board unanimously approved the fraudulent proxy statement and
moved to dismiss the derivative action.23 Finding that Kamen failed to plead
the facts excusing demand with the requisite particularity, the district court
dismissed the action.2
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Frank Easterbrook, affirmed the dismissal for entirely different reasons-
namely, that Kamen failed to make a demand on the board of directors to
file the action.2 Deciding that federal common law governed the derivative
by holding that a shareholder action under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(b), to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by an investment company to its investment
adviser was not a derivative action, that is, not one on behalf of the corporation. See Daily
Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 542; see also id. at 545-46 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(stating that demand requirement was inconsistent with text and legislative history of statute
and "would serve no meaningful purpose and would undermine the efficacy of the statute").
The Court therefore affirmed the lower court decision reversing dismissal of the action based
on the shareholder's failure to make a demand on the board of directors to bring the action.
See id. at 542.
258. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1988). Section 20(a), 15 O.S.C. § 80a-20(a), makes it unlawful
to issue a proxy statement contrary to Securities & Exchange Commission regulations, which
prohibit the issuance of materially misleading statements by registered investment companies,
see 17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-l(a) (1990); id. § 240.14a-9.
259. See Kamen, I llS. Ct. at 1714.
260. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 & nn.8-9
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (collecting authority). The district court implied a private right of action into
the statute. Id. at 1156-60. Because the Seventh Circuit did not address the question and
because the question was not raised in the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court declined
to decide the issue. See Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1715 n.3; see also supra note 126 and
accompanying text (noting Court's refusal to expressly decide question whether implied right
of action exists under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5).
261. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1715.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Kamen, 659 F. Supp. at 1160-63 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1 requires plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits, if required by the applicable law, to
plead the facts excusing demand with particularity.
265. 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990). For a general description of the demand requirement,
see Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
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rules under a federal statute, the Seventh Circuit adopted a new rule different
from that in many states.266 Because the futility exception generated "gobs"
of wasteful litigation,267 the court embraced a universal demand rule proposed
in a tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance, which virtually abolishes the futility exception. 26
Though recognizing that Burks v. Lasker held that state law should
ordinarily be utilized when engaged in this type of interstitial lawmaking
under the federal securities laws, the Seventh Circuit held that Kamen waived
that argument. 269 The court further relied on the 1881 Supreme Court decision
of Hawes v. Oakland270 to conclude that federal common law contains a
demand rule.27' Judge Easterbrook found that the demand requirement "al-
lows directors to make a business decision about ... whether to invest the
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1, 34-38 (1991)
and Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Suits, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 168 (1976).
266. See 908 F.2d at 1344.
267. Id.
268. See id. (relying upon American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORAaE GOVER-
NANCE §§ 7.03(a)-(b) and comment a (Tent. Draft No. 8, Apr. 15, 1988)). The American Law
Institute's tentative draft would excuse demand "only when the plaintiff makes a specific
showing that irreparable injury to the corporation would otherwise result." Principles of
Corporate Governance § 7.03(b). To avoid the costs and time of litigating whether demand
was required, the American Bar Association advanced a similar proposal. See American Bar
Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 45 Bus. LAW. 1241, 1244-46 (1990).
Judge Easterbrook, a member of the American Law Institute, see 2 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7th Cir-15 (1991), previously expressed views similar to those in Kamen
about the futility exception to the demand requirement. See Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870
F.2d 1168, 1174-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (reviewing Delaware law on
excuse of demand in derivative actions and concluding that universal demand rule tentatively
proposed by American Law Institute was preferable). The near abolition of the futility exception
arguably will limit shareholders' ability to bring derivative actions, a view in harmony with
Judge Easterbrook's opinions limiting recovery under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
See Sontag, Harder to Sue, NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1991, at 1, col. 1 (discussing Judge
Easterbrook's § 10(b) opinions); cf. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 505 (1991) (claiming that Judge Easter-
brook's opinion in lender liablity case of Kham & Nate's Shoe's No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of
Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990), "demonstrates the degree to which untethered ideology
distorts the judicial process and the community of discourse that is the law").
In greatly limiting the futility exception, the Seventh Circuit overruled a prior decision.
See Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1347.
269. See Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342. Under the conflicts of law principle known as the
internal affairs rule, the law of the state of incorporation generally governs internal arrange-
ments of corporations. See generally Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs:
Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLtrM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). The
court, however, concluded that, because Kamen failed to mention until her reply brief that
the law of the state in which the Fund is incorporated, Maryland, recognized the futility
exception, she had waived the argument that Maryland law applied. See Kamen, 908 F.2d at
1342.
270. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
271. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342.
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time and resources of the corporation in litigation." 27 2 Finally, despite the
deferential review standard applied by many states in reviewing such a
decision,273 the Seventh Circuit held that, as the American Law Institute's
tentative draft provided, "the making of a demand does not affect the
standard with which the court will assess the board's decision not to sue.
'274
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, unanimously
reversed.275 The Court held that, because the demand question in shareholder
derivative actions "embodies the incorporating State's allocation of governing
powers within the corporation," and because a futility exception was not
inconsistent with federal law, state law determines whether the representative
shareholder in a derivative action under Section 20(a) of the Investment
Company Act must make a demand on the board of directors.
27 6
Despite mandating the application of state law, the Court emphasized
that any rule governing a claim under a federal statute necessarily was a
federal question.27 Federal courts, however, should incorporate state law into
a deficient federal statute unless to do so " 'would frustrate specific objectives
of the federal programs.' "278 In language remarkably similar to that found
in the Court's federal common law cases, the Court emphasized that
a court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial
schemes with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question
evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards .... or when
express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congres-
sional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand .... 279
To buttress that conclusion, the Court read Burks v. Lasker as creating
a "presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common
272. Id. (citations omitted).
273. See infra text accompanying note 290.
274. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344. In its short life span, the Seventh Circuit's approach in
Kamen did not seem to attract many followers. See RCM Securities Fund, Inc. v. Stanton',
928 F.2d 1318, 1325-30 (2d Cir. 1991) (declining to follow Seventh Circuit's approach in
Kamen); Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same).
275. See Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1723. Contrary to the position it asserted in Lampf, Pleva,
see supra text accompanying note 192, the Securities and Exchange Commission supported
application of state law in Kamen. See Brief for the Securities & Exchange Commission as
Amicus Curiae in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991) (No. 90-
516). In many ways, the Court's opinion tracks the SEC's amicus curiae brief.
276. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1714 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 1717 (citing, inter alia, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 476-477). The Court
quickly disposed of the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which governs
the specific procedures governing shareholder derivative actions in federal court, see supra
note 264, imposed a demand requirement on shareholders. The Court held that, consistent
with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988), the rule only provides a vehicle for
execution of a demand if required by the applicable law. See Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1716.
278. Id. at 1717 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
279. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1717 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 366-367 (1943); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-512 (1988);
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-172 (1983)).
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law" when allocation of power between shareholders and the board of
directors is at issue.? 0 State law therefore ordinarily controls whether disin-
terested directors possess the power to terminate a shareholder derivative
action under the federal securities laws'.2s The Court had "little trouble"
concluding that the demand requirement and futility exception fell within the
scope of the state law presumption. 282 According to the Court, the demand
requirement affords the board of directors the opportunity to exercise its
reasonable business judgment and waive a legal right vested in the corporation
if it concludes that to do so would promote the corporation's best interests. 3
Because the shareholder ordinarily cannot sue if the board of directors declines
to do so, the demand requirement protects the prerogative of the board to
sue or not to sue. 4 On the other hand, the Court reasoned that the futility
exception to the demand requirement restricts the board of director's power
to control the initiation of corporate litigation.
285
The Court in a footnote rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
Hawes v. Oakland 8 6 created a federal common law demand requirement. It
concluded that, because Hawes sought to fashion federal common law in a
diversity case, the decision failed to survive Erie and in any event "has been
eclipsed by the philosophy of Burks." 7 In addition, because the entire
dispute centered on the source of the law to be applied, the Court rejected
the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that Kamen waived the argument that state
law applied. 28 The Court hinted at disapproval of the lower court's decision
to fashion a new federal rule "even though neither party addressed whether
the futility exception should be abolished as a matter of federal common
law.,,89
The deferential business judgment rule is the standard by which a court
in some states, including Delaware, generally reviews the board of directors'
decision not to litigate the corporate claim raised by the shareholder in a
derivative suit.29° To avoid the apparent inequities of the application of so
deferential a standard to the litigation decision of the board of directors and
thus possibly the easy derailment of a federal securities claim, KFS contended,
280. Kamen, Il1 S. Ct. at 1717 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
281. Id. at 1719.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (emphasizing that "demand requirement implements 'the basic principle of
corporate governance that the decision of a corporation-including the decision to initiate
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the majority of shareholders.')
(citation omitted).
285. Id. at 1717.
286. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
287. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1718-19 n.6.
288. Id. at 1718.
289. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 265, at 38 (stating
that present state of law raises potential for courts to "sometimes manipulate the demand
rules to dismiss cases they want to dispose of for other reasons").
290. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 & n.10 (Del. 1981).
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as suggested by the American Law Institute's tentative draft and accepted by
the Seventh Circuit, that the demand requirement should not be tied to the
standard used to review the board's decision.29' In familiar tones of condem-
nation of judicial lawmaking, the Court rejected that argument without
equivocation or much elaboration: "Whatever its merits as a matter of legal
reform, we believe that KFS' proposal to detach the demand standard from
the standard for reviewing board action would require a quantum of federal
common lawmaking that exceeds federal courts' interstitial mandate.' '
2
The Court observed that the American Law Institute "developed an
elaborate set of standards that calibrates the deference afforded the decision
of the directors to the character of the claim being asserted by the derivative
plaintiff." 293 In the Court's view, any attempt to fashion such standards
would require the federal courts to create a federal common law of corpo-
rations, a task it declined to assume in Burks v. Lasker.2 4 The Court further
reasoned that, rather than reducing litigation, a universal demand rule in this
circumstance would only shift the focal point of litigation from the futility
exception to the deference due the board's decision under federal law. 295
The Court recognized that the law of the various states differs widely
concerning when the directors have the power to terminate derivative litigation
and when a demand may be excused.2 Refusing to intrude on that diversity
and unwilling to mandate the national uniformity promoted by the Seventh
Circuit, the Court declined to "[s]uperimpos[e] a rule of universal-demand
over the corporate doctrine of [the] States [that] would clearly upset the
balance that they have struck between the power of the individual shareholder
and the power of the directors to control corporate litigation.
' 2
9
Finally, seemingly as an afterthought, the Court found that the application
of state derivative rules was not inconsistent with the Investment Company
Act. 29 It rejected KFS' argument that, by permitting shareholders to sue
without a demand, state law undermined the Act's intent that the 40%70 of
the board of directors independent of the investment adviser would serve as
291. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1720.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE, PRINCn'LS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.08
& § 7.08 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 8, Apr. 1988)).
294. See Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)).
The Court also concluded that such lawmaking would create excessive uncertainty for corpo-
rations with respect to the deference properly accorded to decisions of the board of directors
and would unduly complicate the analysis when a shareholder brought state as well as federal
claims. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1721.
295. Id. at 1721.
296. Id. at 1719 (citing D. DEMoTr, SHAREnOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS § 5.03, at 35
(1987)). See generally D. DEMoTT, supra, § 5.03, at 23-43 (discussing variation in demand
requirements in the law of various states). An example of one variation in the law is that
some states, including Delaware, prevent a shareholder who makes a demand to later declare
that the demand was futile. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (citing
Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421, 422 (Del. 1983)).
297. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1720.
298. Id. at 1722.
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a "watchdog.' '299 Finding that state law generally governed the managerial
authority of the directors,3°° the Court decided that it would be anomalous
to afford the board of directors "greater power to block shareholder derivative
litigation than these actors possess under the law of the State of incorpora-
tion."13°1
In short, the Court in Kamen reaffirmed the holding of Burks v. Lasker
that, unless inconsistent with federal policies, gaps in the federal securities
laws bearing on the allocation of governing powers within the corporation
must be filled with state law.a°2 On that basis, the Court held that the Seventh
Circuit erred in adopting a uniform rule abolishing the futility exception to
the demand requirement for shareholder derivative suits under Section 20(a)
of the Investment Company Act.
303
Although perhaps less starkly than Lampf, Pleva, Kamen raises familiar
issues of federalism, separation of powers and jurisprudence in interstitial
lawmaking. Elaborating on Burks v. Lasker, the Court opts to make state
law the norm-indeed refers to the state law "presumption"-in interstitial
lawmaking under the federal securities laws when the statutory gap implicates
the relative distribution of corporate power between the board of directors
and shareholders. Federalism concerns partially explain the reluctance to
interfere with entities that exist only by virtue of state law. 3°4 To the extent
that state law limits the federal courts' lawmaking powers, it would seem to
make the interstitial lawmaking less of an intrusion on separation of powers
principles. The state law presumption, at least in theory, transfers lawmaking
to a legislative, albeit not federal, branch. Indeed, assuming that Congress
299. Id.; see supra note 242 (discussing purpose of Investment Company Act).
300. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1722.
301. Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Court emphasized that, after concluding
that the board of directors alone could not be relied upon to ensure that the fees of the
investment adviser were reasonable, Congress added § 36(b) to the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1988), which expressly permits a shareholder to sue on behalf of the
investment company for breach of the investment adviser's fiduciary duty. Kamen, 111 S. Ct.
at 1722; see supra note 257 (discussing interpretation of § 36(b) in Daily Income Fund, Inc.
v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984)). In the Court's eyes, § 36(b) suggests that Congress did not
consider shareholder litigation as displacing the authority of the independent directors. Kamen,
111 S. Ct. at 1722.
302. See Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1722.
303. Id. at 1714, 1723. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion. See id. at 1723 & n.10. On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that Kamen's
failure to make a demand on the board was not justified by the futility exception-which was
discussed in one Maryland Court of Appeals decision nearly 25 years old, Parish v. Maryland
& Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 81-84, 242 A.2d 512, 544-45 (1968)-under
Maryland law. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Cash Equivalent Fund, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,183, at 90,988 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 1991) (Easterbrook,
J.).
304. See supra text accompanying note 238. Because corporations are created by state law
but are regulated extensively under the federal securities laws, federalism concerns frequently
come into play in this area. See, e.g., Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. Rav. 813 (1984); Kitch, A Federal Vision of the
Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REv. 857 (1984); Schwartz, supra note 256; Cary, supra note 240.
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was aware of the presumption when passing the law, incorporation of state
law arguably is consistent with Congressional intent.
3 5
Perhaps most importantly, the familiar jurisprudential concern with judges
fashioning large bodies of law out of whole cloth also influenced the Court.
Judicial lawmaking might appear more problematic the greater the body of
law being made. At least intuitively, it appears more troublesome for the
judiciary to create an entire body of law governing shareholder derivative
actions (Kamen) than it is for judges to simply add a missing term to a
statute, such as a limitations period (Lampf, Pleva).' 6
The specter of potential judicial mischief is at its zenith when a court,
with minimal guidance, is permitted to construct an entire corpus of law with
all the intricacies ordinarily found in a comprehensive statutory scheme passed
by Congress with hearings, reports, and debate. Although Lincoln Mills
demonstrates that such an occurrence is not unprecedented, the Supreme
Court, as Kamen suggests, has tended in the intervening years to exhibit
more caution in concluding that a particular substantive area falls within the
common lawmaking power of the federal courts.3°7 The Court in Kamen
clearly refused to do in 1991 for corporate regulation what it had done in
1957 for collective bargaining disputes in Lincoln Mills. It flatly-and unan-
imously-rejected Judge Easterbrook's attempt to fashion a body of federal
corporations law. At least when the judicially made rule would bar a derivative
claim from the courts, the Court acted in a manner suggesting fear of an
activist judiciary.
A troublesome aspect of Kamen is that, as it did in Lampf, Pleva, the
Court avoided analyzing the policy implications of its call for presumptive
incorporation of state law. In a case in which it indeed appeared fruitless to
make a demand on the board of directors, the Court opted for state law,
which recognized a futility exception to the demand requirement. By so doing,
the Court created the possibility that the claim might be decided on the
merits.301 The ultimate question that Kamen's state law presumption leaves is
whether state law in future cases generally will best fulfill the purposes of
the Investment Company Act. At least some members of the prestigious
American Law Institute ("ALI") might think otherwise. Indeed, if ever
presented with the various arguments, the policy justifications in support of
the ALI proposal might persuade Congress. Still, the Court never expressly
addressed the merits of the ALI's proposal, but rather seemed to belittle its
305. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 174 (discussing similar inferences made by
Court in Agency Holding and Lampf, Pleva).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 157-237. In addition, by federalizing labor law,
Lincoln Mills, see supra text accompanying notes 62-68, created difficult problems of federal
pre-emption of state laws-problems that continue to plague the Court. See, e.g., Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). The Court's refusal in Kamen to
federalize shareholder derivative actions may avoid such thorny questions.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54, 69-72.
308. That possibility, however, did not come to-pass. See supra note 303 (discussing
dismissal of case by Seventh Circuit on remand).
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"legal reform" efforts. Nor did it discuss whether, as Judge Easterbrook
concluded, the futility exception led to excessive unproductive litigation.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court's strong
endorsement of the state law presumption and failure to suggest when federal
policies may dictate otherwise, may hamstring the lower courts in future
attempts to faithfully apply the federal securities laws. What would happen
if a state did not recognize a futility exception to the demand requirement
or allowed interested directors to decide whether to pursue a shareholder
derivative suit? Suppose a state abolished derivative actions? Although these
extreme hypotheticals may be so egregious as to be preempted by federal
law, the laws of some states may disfavor in less extreme fashion shareholder
derivative actions,3°9 disfavor that now will be engrafted on the federal
securities laws. There seems to be no legitimate policy reason for that result.
Similar to the impact of McCluny v. Sulliman on the subsequent development
of federal limitations law, the side effects of the Court's unequivocal en-
dorsement of the state law presumption in shareholder derivative suits under
federal statutes may remain for years to come and hinder a potentially
important method of enforcing the federal securities laws. 310 Moreover, though
the breadth of its language suggests that such an occurrence will be rare, the
Court made no suggestion when federal policy might preempt state law with
respect to derivative suits.
3
Put simply, the Court in Kamen once again left unaddressed the policy
questions that it failed to analyze in Burks v. Lasker. Influenced by federalism,
separation of powers and jurisprudential concerns, the Court refused even to
attempt to discern the law that would best fulfill the purposes of the
Investment Company Act. Thus, at least superficially, form prevailed over
substance.
309. See, e.g., R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.5, at 652-55 (1966) (discussing variation
among states in security for expense statutes in derivative litigation); see also L. SOLOMON, D.
SCHWARTZ & J. BAuMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 816-17 (2d ed. 1988) (remarking
that "[a]lthough nuisance suits are not peculiar to the corporate setting, the fact remains that
the law has singled out derivative suits for the imposition of special procedural restrictions
and judicial oversight to discourage abuses of the process because of the large costs that may
be imposed on corporations by people purporting to act on its behalf"); Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 254 (discussing developing caselaw allowing board to reject derivative actions and
suggesting need for legislative reform). Professor DeMott, for example, observes an increasing
tendency for states not to excuse shareholder demand on the board. See D. DEMOTT, supra
note 296, § 5.03, at 31-36; see, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (holding
that shareholder must allege with particularity facts that "create a reasonable doubt that the
directors' action was entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule").
310. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (referring to
shareholder derivative suit as "the chief regulator of corporate management"); Dykstra, The
Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74 (1967) (arguing that barriers to derivative
actions hinder ability of such suits to police corporate officers and directors).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 254-56 (discussing similar criticism of Burks v.
Lasker).
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III. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
As we have seen, the Court's decisions in Lampf, Pleva and Kamen
implicate constitutional, as well as jurisprudential, questions about the legit-
imacy of certain types of interstitial lawmaking. For different reasons, the
divergent paths taken in those cases are unappealing. The courts should not
be confined in interstitial lawmaking options to the law passed by a legislature
governing some analogous state or federal claim, but should do their best to
ensure fidelity to Congressional intent. Despite persistent suggestions to the
contrary, federal courts are constitutionally and statutorily competent to fill
the gaps of a federal statute with the best law regardless of whether it
originated in a law enacted by a state or federal legislature. Importantly,
such lawmaking would not differ significantly from that presently done by
federal judges but obscured by the "borrowing" terminology.
The need for the fashioning of the best law, as opposed to simply relying
on some possibly ill-fitting alternative found elsewhere, is particularly true
with respect to federal securities regulation. The adherence to outdated notions
of "borrowing" or "absorbing" state law has tended to undermine Congress's
regulation of the national securities market. Nor does it make sense to
extrapolate that Congress intended the incorporation of state law that it found
deficient enough to require passage of a comprehensive package of federal
laws.
A. Federalism Concerns
Federalism concerns have been expressed about the federal judiciary's
constitutional and statutory competence to fashion federal common law
without regard to state law. 312 Let us consider the relevance of those concerns
to interstitial lawmaking in the federal securities laws.
When filling gaps in federal statutes, the law that the courts are making
undisputedly is federal.313 The fortuity that Congress failed to perform the
near impossible task of drafting a statute without any omissions should make
no difference in the constitutional sense. Assuming that Congress legitimately
exercised its constitutional powers in enacting the law in the first place,
Congress surely could constitutionally fill the voids in its work. Interstitial
lawmaking therefore should not be viewed as raising the issues of raw
federalism that the Supreme Court saw in Erie.314 To the contrary, the
competence in the federal judiciary to declare federal law "is essential to the
effective implementation of the legislative powers committed to the national
government by the Constitution.
'315
312. See Merrill, supra note 12, at 33-34; Smith, supra note 70, at 597, 608-11; see also
supra note 89 (citing authorities rejecting DelCostello on the ground that it is contrary to
Rules of Decision Act).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 33-73, 75-85.
314. See Mishkin, supra note 21, at 799.
315. Id. at 799-800. But cf. Merrill, supra note 12, at 21 (stating that "[n]either the text
of the Constitution nor the federal history of the Federal Convention gives any indication that
the federal courts are to partake of an advisory, amendatory, or supplementary role in the
formulation of legislation") (footnote omitted).
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Nor can it seriously be disputed that courts must decline to employ state
law to fill the interstices of a federal statute when to do so would defeat
federal policies. a16 Unless one is willing to implausibly claim that states may
act to nullify federal legislation simply because Congress may have been
sloppy, that conclusion seems inevitable. For example, suppose a state had a
two week limitations period governing common law fraud actions. Before
Lampf, Pleva, few would disagree that courts should not allow such a short
limitations period to bar a Section 10(b) claim. However, if federalism
principles were truly at stake, state law might not be so cavalierly dismissed.
After Erie, for example, federal courts generally have not concluded that, if
contrary to federal policies, a court need not apply state substantive law in
a diversity action.
17
Besides constitutionally-based federalism concerns, some argue that the
Rules of Decision Act compels looking to state law as the exclusive interstitial
lawmaking source.3" ' Rejecting a literal interpretation of the Act, the Supreme
Court has held that it does not.319 That reading of the Rules of Decision Act
is consistent with the long history of federal common law, even before the
"new" federal common law spurred on by Erie.312 It also is consistent with
the vast expansion of federal power sanctioned by the Court since passage
of the Act in 1789.321 Even since 1938 and the new spin on federalism offered
by Erie, Congress has engaged in an "orgy of statute making." 3 22 In a parallel
and related development during that same time period, the Court has con-
cluded that Congress has extensive powers under the commerce clause to
regulate matters that only tangentially affect interstate commerce.
323
Congress enacted the Rules of Decision Act in a very different time, an
era with few federal statutes and a narrowly circumscribed notion of federal
316. See supra text accompanying notes 75-120. Even critics of the Court's current
jurisprudence on the subject make this admission. See Burbank, supra note 84, at 770; Merrill,
supra note 12, at 34.
317. But cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (holding in
diversity action that, because federal interests outweighed state interests, federal court could
provide jury trial even though issue would be resolved by judge under state law).
318. See supra note 89 (citing authority criticizing DelCostello on grounds that it is
contrary to Rules of Decision Act).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 86-120 (discussing Court's recent cases on sup-
plying limitations periods for federal statutes).
320. See E. CHaMERINSKY, supra note 12, § 6.1, at 296 n.19 (positing that "[flederal
courts have fashioned common law for almost 200 years, notwithstanding the literal dictate
of the Rules of Decision Act. The statute must be read in light of this history in the absence
of congressional modification or objection.").
321. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987)
(advocating theory of statutory interpretation that allows interpretation of statute to evolve
dynamically with changing developments in society).
322. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AmmRIcAN LAW 95 (1977).
323. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce under Constitution authorized application of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to family-owned restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, in Birmingham, Alabama). See
generally L. TINE, supra note 6, §§ 5-4 to 5-8, at 305-17.
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power. The Act should be interpreted in light of the intervening develop-
ments.3 24 The Court's current interpretation mirrors the changing views of
national power. On the other hand, a formalist interpretation of the Rules
of Decision Act historically has lead to anomalous results. The inconsistency
and lack of uniformity in the statute of limitations law alone exhibits the
need to shed the restraints of a rigid interpretation of the Act.
32
Proponents of the literalist interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act
point out that a safety valve exists to protect valid federal interests. The Act
provides that state law does not apply when federal law "otherwise require[s]
or provide[s]. ' ' 32 In an example of circular logic, when state law is inconsistent
with federal policies (which usually are not defined with any degree of
particularity in the statute), federal law has been treated as "otherwise
requirfing] or provid[ing]. ' '327 That understanding tends to make the appli-
cation of state law appear to be simply a function of judicially defined federal
policies. That, in turn, suggests that the Act makes the borrowing of state
law optional when filling gaps in federal statutes. Those claiming that the
Act restricts the power of the courts to make federal common law, however,
generally view its dictates as mandatory.32 The literalist argument therefore
in reality amounts to little more than a narrow, discretionary restraint on the
federal courts: the Rules of Decision Act requires state law to apply unless
federal law, through policies unstated in the statute, suggests otherwise. In
the end, the literalist argument is nothing more than an unexplained preference
for state rather than federal law. Indeed, the federal policy exception properly
read provides for the displacement of state law in many circumstances when
courts engage in interstitial lawmaking.
Federalism concerns are particularly misplaced when it comes to the
federal securities laws. True, as Burks and Kamen suggest,3 29 caution may be
justified to avoid undue interference with state regulation of corporations
created by state law. 3 0 Nonetheless, the overall goals and purposes of the
federal securities laws should not be forgotten. Congress passed those laws
to cure deficiencies in state law.33' At the same time, Congress sought to
provide a comprehensive uniform scheme to regulate the national securities
market and avoid a repeat of the Crash of 1929.332 To put it gently, it seems
324. See G. CALABRasi, supra note 5; Eskridge, supra note 321; see also Weinberg, Curious
Notion, supra note 17, at 866 (stating that "ilt is time to face up to the fact that the Act
comes down to us as a relic of a prepositivist, prerealist time, with scant relevance for us
today").
325. See supra text accompanying notes 75-156.
326. See supra note 80 (quoting Rules of Decision Act).
327. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147-48
(1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-60 n.13 (1983).
328. See supra note 89 (citing authorities criticizing DelCostello).
329. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991); Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
330. See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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anomalous to borrow what Congress concluded to be deficient state law to
fill gaps in federal statutes designed to cure that deficiency. In light of the
purposes of the federal securities laws, compulsory, or even presumptive,
incorporation of state law to fill the federal interstices is at best curious and
at worst contrary to Congressional intent.
The Court's decisions in Lampf, Pleva and Kamen illustrate the difficulties
with the view that interstitial lawmaking under the federal securities laws is
controlled by state law. Because of reliance on the vagaries of the statutes
of limitations of fifty states, the limitations law governing Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 actions was in serious disarray for decades before the Court
adopted a federal statute of limitations. If federal concerns had not been
under-emphasized and the Rules of Decision Act had not been literally, and
perhaps thoughtlessly, applied, much of the litigation and accompanying
judicial waste might have been avoided.
Similarly, although Kamen is defensible as the best approach to limit the
excesses of judicial lawmaking, there was no need to create a presumption
of state law incorporation into federal law. By wedding the judiciary to state
law, that presumption may unduly inhibit the courts from seeking to ensure
that shareholder derivative actions serve as effective vehicles for the enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws. In so doing, Kamen unfortunately failed,
as Burks did, to offer a hint at when federal policy might displace state
derivative rules.
Nor is there a legitimate justification to indulge in the fiction, as a
plurality of the Court did in Lampf, Pleva, that Congress by its silence
intends for state law to supply a limitations period to a claim that it never
expressly created. 33 Rather, because federal law is at issue, the court is not
bound to apply state law but should-endeavor to fashion the federal law that
best fulfills the purpose of the statute in question. If state law makes the
best federal law, it should be used. Still, the unnecessarily broad presumption
of Kamen and the fictitious attribution of congressional intent in Lampf,
Pleva may unreasonably inhibit the lower courts from striving to make the
federal securities laws work in the most effective fashion.
B. Separation of Powers Concerns
A strict separation of powers perspective might suggest that, if gaps exist
in statutes, the judiciary should not fill them. Rather, so the argument goes,
that task should be left for the institution, Congress, with the constitutional
power to legislate. 334 The logic, of course, is far stricter than any separation
of powers position yet accepted by the Supreme Court. Applying that theory,
virtually all federal common law would be rendered invalid, a position
333. See supra text accompanying note 174.
334. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 170 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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obviously incompatible with the Court's pronouncements. 35 The extreme
separation of powers objection, for a variety of reasons, is particularly
inappropriate when analyzing the problem of filling in the gaps in laws duly
passed by the legislative branch, particularly the federal securities laws.
Interstitial lawmaking in effect is judicial lawmaking by necessity. 336 As
Professor Mishkin so aptly and succinctly summarized:
[Tihe separation of powers cannot be water-tight; exclusive reliance
upon statutory provision for the solution of all problems is futile.
Beyond the political realities which will at times compel congressional
by-passing of any issue-thus leaving it open until pending litigation
forces court resolution-lie such simpler pressures as shortness of
time and, perhaps most important, the severe limits of human fore-
sight. Together, these factors combine to make the concept of stat-
utory enactment as a totally self-sufficient and exclusive legislative
process entirely unreal. At the very least, effective Constitutionalism
requires recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a
matter of common law or "judicial legislation," rules which may be
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory
patterns enacted in the large by Congress. In other words, it must
mean recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the gov-
erning law in an area comprising issues substantially related to an
established program of government operation.
33 7
Congress, despite clear flaws in the laws it passes, frequently falls to
correct them for long periods, if ever.33 As legal academicians are well aware,
the realities of modem politics, not simple legal rationality, come into play
in the legislative process. Unless pressured politically, legislators may not
correct the most obvious errors or fill basic gaps in existing statutes.339
335. See supra text accompanying notes 33-73 (discussing Supreme Court's federal common
law decisions).
336. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing similar rationale for federal common
law).
337. Mishkin, supra note 21, at 800 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
338. See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787, 792-93 (1963).
339. See G. GiLMORE, supra note 322, at 95-96 (remarking that "[o]n the federal level it
is difficult to the point of impossibility to draw the attention of a crisis-ridden Congress to
any area of law reform which, although it may be urgent, has not erupted in political
controversy"); Friendly, supra note 338, at 791-92 (noting that legislatures are better lawmakers
than courts but lamenting that they faif to fully legislate); Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A
Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 OGio ST. L.J. 399, 403 (1989) (judge voicing problems of
legislation including "maladroitness, inconsistencies, and gaps in enacted statutes"); Mikva,
Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 627 (1987) (judge, formerly member of
Congress, expressing lack of attention paid by members of Congress to law and legal
developments); see also L. JAP'E, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that lawmaking role of judiciary
is function of many variables including staffing of legislature and matters of public concern
at the time); Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323-24 (1988) (Remarks of Robert Katzmann) (reporting on study of
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Although many have made concrete suggestions to remedy this problem for
decades, none of the proposals has borne fruit.3
Despite the Court's repeated statements to the contrary, there is little
suggestion that, through inaction, Congress intended the courts to borrow
state law.3 4' Nor ordinarily is there evidence suggesting that Congress intended
a gap in one federal statute to be filled with a provision of another federal
statute. If the other federal provision would be counterproductive when
applied to a different federal statute, a logical (though still fictitious) deduction
is that, rather than borrowing from elsewhere in the law, Congress would
have wanted the courts to formulate the law that best fulfills its purpose.
The question is slightly more complicated when, as in Lampf, Pleva, the
federal statute for other express claims provides analogous provisions that
the court might easily apply to remedies implied into the same law. Although
the incorporation of related federal provisions may effectively fill the inter-
stices of a deficient federal claim, a court should not be precluded from
looking elsewhere if the provisions do not.
Moreover, judicial lawmaking in this realm most definitely is limited.
Interstitial lawmaking is narrower than constitutional interpretation in which
elaborate doctrines have evolved from sparse text.3 42 In contrast, the outer
limits of interstitial lawmaking are defined by the gaps left in the statute.
Consequently, interstitial lawmaking is in many ways similar to the ordinary
task of statutory interpretation performed daily by the federal courts. 3
There is a potential check on judicial abuse of the lawmaking power as
well. If a majority of Congress strongly objects to the interstitial law made
by the courts, it may act to effectively overrule the judiciary.344 Consequently,
even if we distrust the undemocratic judiciary, 345 the democratically elected
Congress has the opportunity to remedy any judicial excesses. Although such
random sample of D.C. Circuit cases and finding that staff of congressional committees with
jurisdiction over the legislation interpreted by the court were generally aware only of major
decisions).
340. See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1921); Friendly, supra
note 338, at 802; Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1417,
1429-34 (1987); see also Abrahamson & Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045 (1991) (discussing interface between
courts and legislatures and reviewing various possibilities for remedying deficient statutes).
341. See supra note 339 (citing authorities showing difficulty in convincing Congress to
act).
342. See supra note 24 (citing authorities contending that federal common law is similar
to constitutional and statutory interpretation); cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2456 (1991) (holding that nude dancing is not "speech" for First Amendment purposes).
343. See supra note 24.
344. See G. CAI.ABRESI, supra note 5, at 92-93. But see Merrill, supra note 12, at 22-23
(criticizing that justification for federal common lawmaking power on grounds that it fails to
remedy Constitutional violation and is unrealistic). At least in politically controversial areas,
such an occurrence is not extraordinary. See Mikva & Bleich, When Congress Overrules the
Court, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 734-44 (1991) (discussing instances of Congress overruling Court
during New Deal and recent years).
345. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).
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Congressional action might seem unlikely, it seems equally improbable that
the judiciary frequently will run amok in filling gaps in a statute. To fulfill
Congressional intent, it is most practical to allow courts leeway rather than
to guarantee that an obviously deficient statute remains deficient in perpetuity.
Observations about Congressional inaction are particularly apt when
discussing the federal securities laws. With the stroke of the pen, Congress
easily could have resolved the questions percolating for years in the lower
courts that the Supreme Court ultimately decided in Lampf, Pleva and Kamen.
The questions, especially the appropriate statute of limitations for implied
rights of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, had long been recog-
nized.3 Congress never acted. Why? The federal securities laws understand-
ably fail to generate the public controversy spawned by issues such as flag
burning,347 civil rights,314 and abortion349 necessary to provoke quick, or
perhaps any, Congressional action.350 Needless to say, elections generally are
not won and lost depending on whether a federal securities claim has a statute
of limitations or whether there is a futility exception to the demand require-
ment in a shareholder derivative suit brought under a federal law regulating
investment companies.
In the end, if the courts wait patiently for Congress to remedy the
shortfalls in the federal securities laws, the wait would be quite'lengthy, if
not interminable. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims remain implied private
rights of action, not ones expressly created by Congress, even though courts
have recognized the rights for nearly half a century.35' The right to a Section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim now is the well-recognized centerpiece of federal
law designed to combat securities fraud. More generally, as the discussion in
this Article illustrates, the rights of action implied into other provisions of
the federal securities laws suggest the consistent lack of attention paid by
Congress to fine-tuning them. This is true even though, by enacting the
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, Congress immediately could
346. See Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to
Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967).
347. For example, in response to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), Congress quickly
passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 700 (West Supp. 1990)), which the Supreme Court just as promptly declared
unconstitutional, see United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 1463 (1990).
348. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 344, at 740-43 (chronicling Congressional response
to decisions of Supreme Court in proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990).
349. In response to Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), in which the Court upheld
the constitutionality of regulations barring federally funded clinics from counseling women on
abortion, the House Appropriations Committee moved within one month to halt enforcement
of the regulation. See Hill Panel Votes to Block Abortion Counseling Ban; Unusual House
Coalition Backs Amendment, Wash. Post, June 21, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
350. See Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1013 (1987)
(noting that statutes most in need of repair often have little political significance).
351. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), is the first
reported decision that implied a private right of action for damages into § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, at 380-81 n.10 (1983) (tracing
history of implied right of action under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
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remedy many of the deficiencies present in the current versions of the federal
securities laws.352 In light of the electorally insignificant nature of the federal
securities laws, interstitial lawmaking in a manner that best fulfills the
statutory mandate-whether or not a similar provision has been passed by a
federal or state legislature-makes eminent sense for the effective administra-
tion of a national regulatory scheme.
C. Jurisprudential Concerns
As voiced by Justice Frankfurter's derision of "judicial inventiveness" in
his dissent in Lincoln Mills, 353 another frequent objection to interstitial law-
making is that judges should not be acting as lawmakers without electoral
constraints. Even if federalism and separation of powers hurdles are sur-
mounted, one might argue that, in order to limit the power of judges to
make law, they should be bound by state law unless clearly contrary to the
mandate of the federal statute. State law might serve to curb the potential
for much-feared judicial abuse. This may be the only viable theory for
requiring state law to fill the interstices of a federal law.
The concern with restrictions on judges' lawmaking power traditionally
has been at the core of debate in jurisprudential circles and at the root of
positivist thought.354 Fearful of judicial discretion, various commentators have
strived for theories to constrain the discretion of judges and offer some
degree of certainty to the law.3 5 The quest for absolute certainty, of course,
is unattainable. 356 Legal Realism long ago undermined the idea that lines
352. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
354. "Positivists" generally consider law to be a rational system of rules influenced by
social life but independent from morality, natural justice, and politics. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
355. See, e.g., M. EISENBERO, Tim NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988) (articulating
theory of common law adjudication in which judicial power is circumscribed by social
propositions).
356. As described by Cardozo:
As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature
of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes
and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of
birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are
born.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 166-67; see also R. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION
20-32 (1990) (discussing Cardozo's theory of law articulated in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS).
The abstract desire for certainty is not unique to federal common law. It persists in
theories of those who claim that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the intent
of the framers, see, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIrCAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 1-265 (1990), and that statutes should be constructed as plain language dictates, see,
e.g., Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988).
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could be drawn neatly to circumscribe judicial discretion.357 That observation
is evident from the limited ability of precedent to bind a court, a fundamental
principle of the American legal system.35 Nonetheless, "our quest for c~rtitude
is so ardent that we pay an irrational reverence to a technique which uses
symbols of certainty, even though experience again and again warns us that
they are delusive.
''359
Most-particularly liberals fearful of an increasingly conservative federal
judiciary-might agree that there must be some constraints on the power of
the courts to fashion law. Though legal doctrine may be unable to dictate
results, it may narrow the range of permissible options for judges.3w6 By
requiring judges to borrow state law, the presumption of Burks v. Lasker
and the traditional wisdom of borrowing state limitations periods in Theory
narrowed the options and limited the discretion of judges to make law when
filling the voids in the federal securities laws. However, as the developments
culminating in Lampf, Pleva illusfrate, that theory in practice suffers from
serious flaws. Besides lengthy indeterminate litigation accompanied by uncer-
tainty and waste, blind incorporation of state law may result in undesirable
results, if not results that undermine the effective implementation of the
federal securities laws.
Moreover, consistent with previous line-drawing attempts, the state law
presumption engrafted on interstitial lawmaking never truly limited the dis-
cretion of judges. For example, before Lampf, Pleva, the lower courts selected
from a variety of different types of state limitation periods for causes of
action deemed "analogous," an amorbh6us benchmark at best. 36' The deter-
mination of what claims are analogous necessarily offers a wide range of
options and considerable room for argument.
The borrowing from federal sources is marked by similar discretion. In
Lampf, Pleva, the Court considered federal policies and the practicalities of
litigation and selected one-with no" explanation for the particular selection-
from numerous alternative statutes of limitations from federal sources.
362
Though masking that selection withan attenuated theory of Congressional
intent, the Court implicitly made a policy judgment about. the proper limi-
tations period for Section 10(b) actions.
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook's ability in Kamen to find the room to,
fashion uniquely federal law in the ,face of the Court's coiitrary holding in
Burks v. Lasker, exemplifies the leeway in the law.363 In reversing, the Court
357. See, e.g., K. LLEWBLLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADrrIoN (1960).
358. See K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 357, at 62-120.
359. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Gat Co., 320 U.S. 591, 644 n.40 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
360. See Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); see also Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAgv. L. REv. 43, 101 n.236
(1989) (recognizing similar phenomenon in constitutional adjudication).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 157-237.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 265-74.
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made a policy judgment, at least in the individual case, that Kamen's
shareholder derivative suit should not be thrown out of court based on a
brand new federal common law rule. The Court, however, did not appear to
consider the impact of its decision on future cases and the policy implications
of compulsory application of the law of the states with a less favorable tilt
toward shareholder derivative actions than the law before it.
The Court's decisions in Lampf, Pleva and Kamen in tandem once again
demonstrate that federal courts enjoy significant discretion when engaging in
interstitial lawmaking under the federal securities laws. In the end, as in
virtually every substantive area, judges to some degree and in some respects
have discretion to make law within certain constraints.
It is a small step in logic to conclude that, rather than simply borrowing
federal or state law, judges filling in the interstices of the federal securities
laws should fashion the best law by considering the policies underlying those
laws and the practicalities of enforcement litigation.364 In light of the diffi-
culties of divining Congressional intent, the Court admittedly resorts to
"policy considerations ... to flesh out the portions of the [federal securities
laws] with respect to which ... the congressional enactment ... offer[s]
[no] conclusive guidance.' '36 The same technique would be equally effective
in filling voids in the federal securities laws to ensure that interstitial law is
consistent with the purposes of the comprehensive scheme of securities reg-
ulation.
Such an approach also applies to the fashioning of statutes of limitations.
The equitable doctrine of laches represents judicially-made, yet flexible limi-
tations periods.366 Although laches might seem to constitute legislation by
"judicial fiat,'' 3 67 the same accusation could be made with respect to the
selection of a statute of limitations in Lampf, Pleva as well as the selection
of virtually any limitations period. Except for reasons of artificial certainty,
why should the courts blindly adopt a state or federal limitations period
applicable to another claim-if deficient in some significant way-simply
because it has the imprimatur of some legislature? If we admit that interstitial
lawmaking most definitely is judicial legislation, courts, it would seem, should
strive to "pass" the best law.
Although the Supreme Court in Kamen rejected Judge Easterbrook's
activist attempt at law reform, it might have done better to determine whether
state .law indeed made the best federal law in a broad range of shareholder
derivative actions. The Court instead endorsed an across-the-board presump-
tion of state law incorporation into federal law when, as the development in
the statute of limitations cases suggests, that presumption may prevent the
lower courts from fashioning the federal law that best implements the hopes
364. See generally R. DwoRucN, LAw's Empni (1986).
365. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); see Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991).
366. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
367. Cf. Guin & Donaldson, supra note 129, at 563 (criticizing Third Circuit's decision
in Data Access in that regard).
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and goals of the federal securities laws. Insistent on restraining the lawmaking
power of the federal courts, the Court did not truly investigate the question
whether, as a matter of policy, the substantive state law made sense when
incorporated into the particular federal securities statute in question.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions last Term in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson3'6 and Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc. 69 reflect the recurring tension in the Court's federal common law and
interstitial lawmaking decisions between constitutional principles of federalism
and separation of powers, as well as the general concerns with imposing
limits on judicial lawmaking. This Article attempts to outline some ideas
supporting the position that, when filling gaps in federal statutes, courts
should strive to make the best federal law possible. Neither federalism nor
separation of powers principles suggest that this task is constitutionally infirm
and that the federal courts are obligated to borrow state law. Although
restrictions on the ability of judges to make law are necessary, the quest for
absolute limits should not lead to the creation of federal law that undermines
the purposes for which Congress passed the legislation.
For similar reasons, the idea that, if not forced to borrow state law,
courts engaged in interstitial lawmaking must borrow from an analogous
federal statute is flawed as well. Simply because a law was passed by Congress
does not by itself suggest that its provisions will work effectively when
plugged into an entirely different statute. Put simply, the judiciary should
not be limited in its options between statutes passed by a state or federal
legislature. The courts instead, when necessary, should tailor the missing
provisions to most effectively implement the statutory program in question.
These arguments carry particular weight when applied to the federal
securities laws. Congress designed these laws to remedy shortfalls in state
regulation of the interstate securities markets and offer a uniform system of
national regulation. The interstices of the regulatory scheme created by these
laws are vast. Congress cannot be expected to be pressured politically to fill
them. By necessity, the judiciary must fulfill its constitutional responsibility.
The statutes themselves, as well as their purposes, serve as the constraints on
judicial lawmaking. Although not failsafe, such constraints are the best
available and not much different in character from those limiting lawmaking
under traditional borrowing doctrines.
For those wedded to federalism, separation of powers, and jurisprudential
objections to interstitial lawmaking, the logical course would seem to be the
abolition of federal common law. Because opponents of federal common law
claim that such lawmaking creates laxity in the legislature, its abolition
theoretically would pressure Congress to act. In light of the history of federal
368. Ill S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
369. Ill S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
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common law and interstitial lawmaking, that approach, however, is not a
pragmatic alternative. It would undermine the effectiveness of federal laws
passed by Congress and would leave the federal securities laws unsettled
indefinitely.
